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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
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1.1 THE ISSUE 
 
The impact of financial development (financial constraint) on firms’ internation- 
alization has receiving growing attentions among economists and policy makers. As 
widely believed, better access to external finance facilitates global activities. In the 
recent financial crisis, when credit suddenly dried out, we did observe sharp decline 
of global foreign direct investment flow as well as trade. For instance, as World 
Investment Report 2009 tells, global FDI inflow fell 14% in 2008, amount to 1.697 
billion dollar. This triggered out the emergence of a huge body of literature which 
uses various data sets to re-emphasize the importance of external finance’s 
availability to multinational firms.  
 
Nevertheless, most of them focus on the size effect of financial availability while 
neglect the structure effect of financial development. One obvious fact is that firms 
are heterogeneous, and they react to shocks and policies differently. It is important 
to notice that also during the current financial crisis, a significant fraction of firms 
reallocate capital structure and their sales remain unchanged or even expanded 
(reported by World Bank Financial Crisis Survey, 2010). Therefore, this thesis 
addresses the question that how heterogeneous firms behave differently in terms of 
making investment decisions and choosing types of external finance. Moreover, I 
extend the heterogeneous firms set-up into a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model, embedded with New Keynesian model features, to analyze the 
transmission of shocks and make implications for policies.  
 
Particularly, in chapter 2, I study the impact of financial development on foreign 
direct investment with multiple sources of external finance. It is motivated directly 
by the fact that facing crunch of bank credit, not all the firms are left helpless. Some 
less productive firms do suffer from less availability of credit, yet a bunch of 
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productive firms resort to alternative finance, e.g., bond market, to restore their 
investment. As former chairman of Federal Reserve Mr. Greenspan argues, the 
development of alternative financing channels helped to fill the funding gap and 
stabilize business financing, although people with disagreement point out that the 
shortage of liquidity in one financial market dries out other market. The chapter 2 
contributes to the discussion and investigates firms’ choices among internal fund, 
bank credit and bond market credit in a very simple framework. Firms are 
heterogeneous in productivity, hence the ability of generating profit from FDI. We 
find that with a cut of bank credit, productive firms switch to bond finance to 
stabilize the investment. We call this result substitution effect between bank finance 
and bond finance, which is emphasized by Mr. Greenspan. However, the increased 
demand for bond finance of these productive firms bids up the bond rate, making it 
more expensive for others. As a consequence, less productive firms are forced to exit 
FDI market. This is called complementary effect between bank and bond finances in 
the sense that a cut in bank credit is associated with a higher cost of bond credit. 
The rising bond rate induces the reallocation of financial resources from less 
efficient firms towards more efficient ones and thus increases the aggregate 
industry productivity of the producing firms through a Meltiz-type selection effect.  
 
Continue with this work, I further discuss firms’ choices of different sources of 
external finance and the impact of financial structure on the performance of FDI in 
chapter 3. This research is motivated by two observations: first, countries are 
different in financial systems. For example, as discussed by Fiore and Uhlig (2005), 
Germany (or Japan) has a bank based financial system while U.S (or U.K) has a 
market-based system; and second, FDI flows from countries with market-based 
financial system are more volatile relative to that from countries with bank-based 
system. As risk is a main driving force for volatility of investment and a key 
determinant for choosing capital structure, I therefore explicitly investigate the 
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relationship between financial structure and the risk of FDI.  
 
Precisely, in chapter 3, I model firms’ choices of lenders when they engage in FDI. 
They can choose indirect finance as borrowing from banks or direct finance as 
issuing bond to bondholders. There are many differences between direct finance 
and indirect finance, as emphasized by different economists. For example, Russ and 
Valderrama (2009) argue that the fixed cost of underwriting bond finance is higher 
than bank finance while the marginal cost is lower. Most of others, agree on the 
characteristics of banks as costly middleman or delegated monitor compared to 
direct finance (Holstrom and Tirole, 1997, Fiore and Uhlig, 2005, etc.). I take 
Holstrom and Tirole (1997)’s specification in the model. Particularly, as FDI is risky, 
firms with lowest productivities will be unable to do FDI, and those with 
intermediate productivities choose bank finance while those most productive firms 
use direct finance. The partition of firms results from banks’ role as monitor: on one 
hand, it reduces the risk (and the moral hazard problem) of FDI; on the other hand, 
monitor is costly for firms. For less productive firms, finance through banks is better 
because they are more fragile to risk. However, those most productive firms will 
find it not attractive to hire an intermediary when financing the investment.  
 
Based on firms’ choice of their lenders, the financial structure of the economy is 
therefore calculated as the ratio of aggregated bond finance over aggregate bank 
finance. We discuss the relationships between the financial structure and risk of FDI. 
Our model predicts that, ceteris paribus, if the risk of destination country is higher, 
more firms use bank finance relative to bond finance. Moreover, in case of 
productivity growth, other things equal, more firms will use bond finance and they 
will invest in riskier countries. The first prediction exams the relationship between 
financial structure and expected risk of FDI; while the second prediction exams the 
effect of productivity growth on both financial structure and risk-taking of FDI. 
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Both predictions are supported by our empirical analysis. In particular, we find that 
higher ratio of bond finance relative to bank finance is associated with higher risk of 
FDI per destination country, which is consistent with Germany and U.S example.  
 
Finally, I embed firm heterogeneity and therefore their endogenous entry and exit 
into a DSGE framework to analyze the transmission of shocks and discuss monetary 
policy in chapter 4. This work is strongly motivated by the facts that entry is 
pro-cyclical while exit is counter-cyclical, and they are more volatile than output 
(see figure 4.1 and 4.2). Moreover, the entry and exit account significant share of 
output volatility, as suggested by Broda and Weinstein (2010) that in each unit 
increase in output, 35% of which comes from introduction of new products. Bernard, 
Redding and Schott (2010) also report that the value of newly introduced products 
accounts for 33.6% of total output while the value of destructed accounts for 30.4%.  
 
However, most of the traditional DSGE models assume constant number of 
producers, and the fluctuations of the economy in these models simply reflect the 
reactions of producers’ intensive margin to shock, i.e., producers react by cutting or 
increasing sales. These models do not capture the cyclical behavior of entry and exit, 
and they face a lot of well know challenges in predicting the impulse responses of 
variables compared to what data suggests. For example, the counter-cyclical 
behavior of markups with pro-cyclical behavior of profit that are observed by data 
can not be generated by tradition RBC models or New Keynesian models. Moreover, 
traditional RBC models depend heavily on the persistence of shocks to explain the 
observed persistence of total factor productivity (TFP). In addition, in the second 
moment evaluation, these models generate too smooth consumption and labor and 
too pro-cyclicality of all the variables (too high correlation between variables and 
output). 
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By introducing endogenous entry and exit in a New Keynesian framework, we are 
able to make substantial improvements on the performance of the model in many 
aspects. The aggregate output depends on number of producers, and we find a new 
mechanism of the transmission of shocks: through the dynamics of firms. Moreover, 
in our model, the New Keynesian Phillips curve has additional tradeoff for policy 
makers such that the number of producers has impact on inflation. This opens the 
door for optimal policy analysis. We explicitly discuss the implications of out model 
in chapter 4. 
 
1.2 BRIEF SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
 
Since Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004), it is widely believed and empirically 
supported (somehow) that firm’s productivity is a key determinant for its 
internationalization. Particularly, Melitz (2003) is the workhorse for analyzing 
international trade with heterogeneous firms. Manova (2007) introduces 
export-oriented bank credit and takes credit constraint as another important 
determinant for firms’ export. Her research is followed by a growing empirical 
analysis, such as Muuls (2008), Berman and Hericourt (2008), etc. Buch et al. (2009) 
focus on the impact of financial constraint on FDI with German firm level data. 
 
Regarding the financial structure, we focus on the structure of private finance and 
public finance, i.e., the choices of lenders, although there is large body of literature 
on firms’ choice between equity and debt. Holstrom and Tirole (1997) model a 
moral hazard problem with firms heterogeneous in initial wealth. They find a 
pecking order of the external finance that firms with largest initial wealth can 
borrow from market finance while those with intermediate initial wealth borrow 
from banks who monitor the firms to reduce the moral hazard problem. Fiore and 
Uhlig (2005) discuss the differences of financial system between Europe and U.S, 
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using a model with continuous level of shocks. Antràs, et al. (2009) analyze the 
impact of imperfect capital market on FDI flows which predicts that the cost of 
financial contracting and weak investor protection increases the reliance on FDI 
flows. 
 
Finally, regarding the DSGE model with endogenous entry and exit, Bilbiie, Ghironi 
and Melitz (2007a, 2007b) introduced the endogenous entry but assume a constant 
exit rate of firms. Their models make some progress in bringing the dynamics of 
firms into real business cycle analysis and monetary policy analysis. However, their 
models generate some counter-intuitive impulse responses, e.g., inflation reacts 
positively to an expansionary productivity shock. And their models do not perform 
better than traditional RBC models in terms of second moment. Nevertheless, their 
models are important for understanding the effect of endogenous entry, as a lot of 
authors are emphasizing the importance of firms dynamics: Campbell (1998), 
Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) etc. 
 
1.3 MAIN CONTRIBUTION 
 
This thesis contributes to the growing literature on financial development and firms 
internationalization in respect to that we are the first to address the impact of 
multiple sources of external finance on firms FDI. We discuss the selection effect 
through financial market such that besides the positive impact of technology spill 
over of multinationals on host countries, FDI can bring productivity gains in 
sourcing country through competition in financial market.  
 
Moreover, the thesis is the earliest research that has close look at the risk of FDI and 
links it with the financial structure of the sourcing countries. We emphasize the 
impact of the type other than availability of external finance on performance of FDI. 
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Such an examination is important when we make policy implications on the 
development of certain type of financial system to facilitate FDI. The strategy of 
modeling firms heterogeneity in continuous manner also brings benefit for 
addressing related questions. 
 
Last but not least, this thesis proposes a DSGE model with endogenous entry and 
exit of firms. It is more close to the reality that entry and exit exhibit cyclical 
behaviors. Moreover, we substantially improve the performance of the model in 
terms of impulse responses and second moment compared to traditional New 
Keynesian model as well as models with only endogenous entry (Bilbiie, Ghironi 
and Melitz (2007a, 2007b)). Finally, the model with endogenous entry and exit finds 
a new mechanism of transmission of shocks, which opens the door for further 
optimal policy studies. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Multiple Sources of Finance,  
Margins of FDI, and Aggregate  
Industry Productivity 
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2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
An emerging body of literature documents the impact of financial development on 
facilitating firm internationalization. While its function through providing a larger 
scale of external finance and relaxing firms’ financial constraints is widely accepted, 
it is not clear whether the diversification of financial channels and access to 
alternative finance accompanied by financial development play a role. Attention 
was drawn to the significance of multiple sources of financing by Chairman Alan 
Greenspan after the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis (Greenspan, 2000). He argued 
that the development of alternative financing channels helped to fill the funding 
gap and stabilize business financing, which are especially important when either 
banks or capital markets freeze up in a crisis. Following this argument and 
motivated by the observations of credit crunch and simultaneous drawdown in 
foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) in the recent financial crisis, we address 
the question of whether the availability of alternative financing sources could help 
reduce the size of the collapse and influence welfare.  
 
Multinational firms have better access to multiple sources of finance than their 
domestically oriented peers. Firstly, multinational firms are usually large and 
productive ones (Helpman et al., 2004; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). Thus, they have 
a better chance of accessing market finance other than bank borrowing (Cantillo and 
Wright, 2000). Moreover, some firms can gain additional financial support from 
business partners or from the government in the form of trade credit or special 
policy loans. Secondly, multinational firms have access to finance from different 
locations. They can obtain finance from their parent country, raise funds from their 
host country locally or in some cases explore lower-cost finance on a worldwide 
basis (Antras et al., 2009; Marin and Schnitzer, 2006). Meanwhile, the internal capital 
market among the parent company and its foreign affiliates plays an important role 
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for multinational firms. The allocation of funds through the internal capital market 
extensively substitutes for external financing when the latter is costly (Desai et al., 
2004). Finally, firms tend to keep a precautionary fund reserve to adapt to potential 
risks and uncertainty (Bates et al., 2009; Riddick and Whited, 2009), which is 
particularly the case for multinational firms considering the extra cost and higher 
risk in foreign operations.   
 
Basing on a heterogeneous firm set-up, we model firms’ access to the internal capital 
market, bank finance as well as bond finance and investigate how firms’ adjustment 
among multiple sources of finance affects their performance in foreign direct 
investment and the aggregate industry productivity. We find that given exogenous 
contraction in the supply of bank finance, firms with different productivities react 
differently. Some less productive firms exit from the foreign market due to less 
access to bank finance and the unaffordable high cost of bond finance as a result of 
tougher competition in the bond market. In comparison, some relatively more 
productive firms can resort to bond finance as compensation for decreased bank 
finance to sustain their multinational status. The increased demand for bond finance 
as a substitute for bank finance by the surviving multinationals exacerbates the 
competition in the bond market and bids up the bond return rate, which triggers a 
Melitz-type selection effect through the bond market and brings aggregate industry 
productivity gains. However, the divestment of those failing FDI firms and thus 
their reduced bond financing demand mitigate this effect.  
 
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it complements the quickly 
growing literature on credit constraint and firm internationalization by firstly 
proposing the impact of alternative financing and differentiating firm responses to 
the worsening financial condition. Manova (2007) introduces credit constraint into 
Melitz’s (2003) research and argues that credit constraint restricts firms’ 
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participation and performance in cross-border activity. Arndt et al. (2009), Berman 
and Hericourt (2008), Buch et al. (2009), Li and Yu (2009) and Muuls (2008) provide 
supportive evidence for this argument using firm-level data from different countries. 
We reproduce this result that bad credit conditions impede firms from engaging in 
FDI. Furthermore, we show that this effect could be mitigated with the existence of 
alternative financing and could vary across firms with different productivities. 
Compensation from bond finance and the reallocation of the available funds 
stabilize firm financing and facilitate FDI. However, only the most productive firms 
are able to take advantage of multiple sources of finance in smoothing foreign 
investment.  
 
Secondly, this chapter contributes to the work on financial systems by analyzing the 
complementary and substitution effects of bank finance and bond finance. Precisely, 
we find that more productive firms use more alternative finance as substitution to 
reduce the risk of credit shortage and risk of investment; hence the failure rate of 
firms’ FDI is endogenized in our model. The less productive firms, on the contrary, 
being unable to afford more expensive alternative finance, will choose to exit FDI 
market facing credit crunch; hence we also observe complementary effects. In 
existing literature, Datta et al. (1999) and Diamond (1991) document the 
complement of bank finance to bond finance by monitoring. Davis and Mayer (1991) 
show that the bank and bond markets can be alternatives to each other but they are 
not perfect substitutes. Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) focus on the role of bank 
finance in providing a back-up source and liquidity insurance for bond finance 
against market shocks. The complementary and substitution effects coexist in our 
model, which vary across firms. Although the substitution of multiple sources of 
finance could reduce the sensitivity of FDI to adverse shocks, only a fraction of 
more productive firms benefit from it. The complementary effect of bond finance on 
bank finance for those less productive firms implies that bond finance cannot fully 
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substitute for bank finance when the banking sector faces a crisis. In our model, it is 
the higher cost of bond finance over bank finance that hinders less productive firms 
from employing alternative financing, thus leading to the limited substitutability 
between the two sources. Our result suggests the importance of reducing the cost of 
bond finance and developing multi-layers of the financial system to satisfy the 
financing demand of various firms, especially those lower-quality firms.  
 
Thirdly, we propose FDI-induced aggregate productivity gains for the parent 
country through the selection effect in the capital market. Although the question of 
whether FDI benefits its host country in productivity through technology spillover 
to local firms is widely discussed (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Bitzer and Görg, 2005; 
Haskel et al., 2002; Javorcik, 2004; Keller and Yeaple, 2003), the impact of FDI on the 
parent country is rarely considered. Compared with Pottelsberghel and Lichtenberg 
(2001), who present evidence that a country gains from outward FDI through 
technology sourcing, we show that FDI could bring aggregate productivity gains for 
the parent country through the reallocation of financial resources towards more 
productive firms. The tougher competition in the bond market induced by the large 
FDI financing demand selects the least productive firms out of production and 
enhances the aggregate productivity. However, this effect is dampened due to firms’ 
adjustment among multiple sources of finance.    
 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 starts with the model in a closed 
economy as a benchmark case. After that, we introduce multiple sources of finance 
in an open economy setting, allowing firms to go abroad where the interaction of 
bank finance and bond finance and its impact on the margins of FDI are 
investigated. Section 2.3 characterizes the general equilibrium and discusses the 
aggregate outcome on industry productivity. Section 2.4 concludes. 
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2.2  THE MODEL 
 
Consider a world with two countries. We call one country the home (domestic) 
country and the other the host (foreign) country for FDI. There is a continuum of 
firms, indexed by i, producing differentiated varieties in each country. 
 
Firm i is born with initial internal fund Ni, which is a random number from a 
common distribution ( Ni). After paying an entry cost of fe (fe <Ni), the firm draws 
productivity i from a common distribution g() (Melitz, 2003). With the knowledge 
of its own productivity, the firm makes the investing decision among three potential 
options: (1) purchasing corporate bonds Bi; (2) investing in domestic production, i.e. 
producing and selling a distinct product  in the home country, the output being 
denoted by qiD; (3) engaging in FDI, i.e. producing and selling  in the host country, 
the output being denoted by qiF. Note that the subscript D denotes variables for 
domestic production whereas F denotes those for foreign production; these apply to 
the whole chapter. 
 
There is a perfect bond market in the economy in which firms can either buy or 
issue bonds, Bi being positive or negative accordingly. Upon a draw of very low 
productivity, producing is not as profitable as buying bonds. The firm therefore 
invests all its internal funds in bond holdings to achieve a safe return. Upon a draw 
of high productivity, on the contrary, the firm will produce. If its internal fund is not 
enough to pay the production cost, the firm will raise the working capital by issuing 
corporate bonds through bond markets.  
 
There is no fixed cost for the firm to invest in the bond market. In contrast, if the 
firm engages in production, regardless of whether it is domestic production or FDI, 
it must pay a fixed overhead cost f to set up the factory. In addition, there is an extra 
- 15 - 
 
fixed cost CF for FDI. f and CF are measured in labor units. 
 
2.2.1 CLOSED ECONOMY 
This subsection provides the closed economy case as a benchmark in which firms 
only serve the domestic market and obtain external finance merely by issuing 
corporate bonds. 
 
2.2.1.1 Demand 
The utility function of a representative consumer is  
 
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where the set  represents the mass of available varieties and  denotes the 
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. Defining the aggregate good 
QU with the aggregate price 
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and solving the expenditure minimization problem of the consumer, we have the 
demand function for every variety . 
 
 
Q
p
P
q


 





                          (2.1) 
2.2.1.2 Production 
Each firm i produces a distinct variety  and its output for the domestic market is 
denoted as qiD. Labor is the only input. Define the cost function for producing qiD as:  
f
q
l
i
iD
iD 

                         (2.2) 
where f0 is the fixed cost for production, which is the same for any single firm. i is 
the firm-specific productivity. The domestic nominal wage is denoted as wD. 
Assume that labor must be prepaid. 
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2.2.1.3 Bond Market 
Assume that the bond market is perfect in the sense that it is competitive and there 
is no information asymmetry, and the equilibrium bond rate is r. Firms can invest 
their internal funds in buying a bond and achieve a return rate of 1+r. In 
comparison, firms for which the domestic production is confined by limited internal 
funds can also issue bonds at the rate of 1+r. In the general equilibrium setting, the 
bond return rate r is determined by the condition that there is no aggregate net 
demand for bonds. For a single firm, however, r is given.  
 
2.2.1.4 Firms’ Optimal Decision 
In a closed economy, firm i allocates its own disposable internal fund after entry 
cost is paid between bond holding Bi and domestic production qiD (if it produces) 
and maximizes the total profit from the investment portfolio. Firm i solves 
iiD Bp ,
max     iiDDiDiDiD rBlwqp   
s.t.   eiiiDD fNBlw  ; (2.1); (2.2) 
where piD is the product price in the home country. We have: 
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Bond holdings Bi can be calculated from the budget constraint.  
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Proposition 2.1 (composition of pricing under limited internal funds): Both the 
financing cost (bond rate r) and the labor cost (wage rate wD over firm-specific productivity 
i) compose the product price. Other things being equal, the higher r, higher wD or lower i, 
the higher the product price and the lower the output.  
 
In our setting, the derived price piD consists of three parts: labor cost wD/i, markup 
/(1) and an additional part 1+r, where 1+r reflects the extra external financing 
cost. If a firm does not have sufficient internal funds for production, it issues a bond 
with a cost of 1+r to raise working capital. Therefore, the limited internal fund 
set-up results in a higher price and lower output compared to traditional set-up 
(e.g., Melitz 2003). To focus on the discussion on productivity in this chapter, we do 
not model firm heterogeneity in terms of internal fund N, though the effect of N on 
firm financing and production works through aggregation. If all the firms have 
more internal funds (N increases), they will issue fewer (or hold more) bonds, hence 
the bond demand increases relative to the supply and the bond return rate r 
declines. Other things being equal, the decreased financing cost results in a lower 
price and the supply of each variety will increase. 
 
2.2.1.5 Cutoff Productivity for Domestic Production 
As in Melitz (2003), a firm’s profit from domestic production depends on its 
productivity. The less productive the firm is, the less profit it earns from production. 
Therefore, only those firms with productivities above a certain threshold will 
produce because of the existence of outside option. In our model, safe return rate 
from bond market is the outside option, and firms compare the profits from 
production and those from investing all their internal funds in purchasing bonds 
and choose to produce if and only if the former is greater than the latter; therefore, 
the cutoff productivity for domestic production *iD is determined by equation (2.7) 
below: 
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            eiiiDDiDiD fNrrBlwqp                  (2.7) 
Using (2.3), (2.4), (2.5) and the binding budget constraint, we have 
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Proposition 2.2 (cutoff productivity for domestic production): The cutoff productivity 
for domestic production *iD is higher with a higher fixed production cost f, higher labor 
wage wD or higher financing cost r. 
 
f and wD measure the real cost while r measures the financial cost of production. 
Intuitively, proposition 2.2 says that higher cost requires higher productivity for 
firms to be able to produce. The shapes of the increasing relationships depend on 
elasticity of substitution ε. For example, when ε is less than 2, the cutoff productivity 
is convex in f, while when ε is larger than 2, it is concave in f. As for the impact of 
the firm’s internal fund, it only works through the bond market in aggregation. As 
we discussed in proposition 2.1, firms’ bond holding increases with their internal 
funds. More aggregate internal funds could pull down the bond rate and result in a 
lower cutoff productivity. However, in partial equilibrium, the bond rate is 
exogenous for a single firm. Therefore, the internal fund is not directly related to the 
firm-level cutoff productivity.  
 
2.2.2 OPEN ECONOMY 
In this subsection, we consider the case of an open economy in the sense that firms 
are interested in producing domestically as well as expanding production to a 
foreign country by means of FDI. Meanwhile, we introduce going-abroad-oriented 
bank credit as alternative financing and reconsider the above firm’s investment 
portfolio decision. The cutoff productivity for a firm to become a multinational is 
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also derived. Moreover, the interaction of borrowing from a bank and issuing 
corporate bonds and the overall effect of multiple sources of finance are discussed.  
 
2.2.2.1 Demand 
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume the aggregate price index 
and aggregate goods index in the host country are the same as those in the home 
country, and are denoted again as P and Q, respectively. We impose further the 
assumption that when the economy shifts from autarky to openness, P and Q will 
not change. In other words, the new varieties coming in as the result of openness 
will not affect the aggregate indices. The demand function for each variety in the 
host country is given by: 
Q
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                       (2.9) 
2.2.2.2 Production 
Assume firm i’s productivity spills over to its foreign affiliate and it produces in the 
foreign country with the same productivity as in the home country but it has to 
shoulder an extra fixed cost CF to carry out FDI. This foreign expansion-induced 
fixed cost includes the expenses for building up foreign affiliates and distribution 
channels, collecting information about the foreign market and foreign regulations, 
etc. Regardless of the form of such a cost, it is independent of the firm’s output and 
must be paid before the firm’s revenue in the foreign market is generated. This cost 
CF is assumed to be uncertain for the firm at the moment when a firm arranges its 
investment portfolio. The distribution of CF is common knowledge and the FDI 
decision is made based on firm’s expectation for CF. CF is revealed when the firm 
sets foot on the foreign land. FDI is successful (hence FDI profit is received) only if 
CF is fully covered. 
 
In an open economy, the domestic production function is the same as equation (2.2), 
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whereas the production function for FDI is given as: 
F
i
iF
iF Cf
q
l 

                      (2.10) 
where qiF and liF are respectively output and labor input in the foreign country. Here 
assume that the extra fixed cost CF follows a concave distribution f(CF) with support    
[0, ]. The f(CF) has the cumulative distribution F(CF).   
 
2.2.2.3 Going-Abroad-Oriented Loans and Probability of FDI Success 
To cover CF, the firm can obtain finance from banks. Assume that a going-abroad- 
oriented bank loan is available for all FDI firms. Such loans aim to release firms’ 
financial constraints due to the substantial upfront costs of FDI and are therefore 
assumed to be used only to shoulder CF.1 Collateral is required by banks. Firm i 
pledges a fraction , (0,1], of the overhead fixed cost f as collateral to obtain a 
bank loan of the amount of f, where  is the multiplier over the collateral. Here 
we use μ to measure the availability of external bank credit, which is an indicator of 
country-specific financial development. The higher μ implies better access to bank 
credit and better financial development of a country. For simplicity, we further 
assume that borrowing from banks is costless as bankers are competitive and have 
no access to the bond market.  
 
Moreover, to guarantee the sufficiency of funds to cover CF and thus the success of 
FDI, firms may keep some reserve funds A besides the bank borrowing f to pay 
the extra fixed cost. A could be a fraction of the internal fund or financed from the 
bond market. Therefore, before CF is revealed, the firm has A+f prepared. Hence, 
the probability of the FDI’s success is Prob(CFA+f)=F(A+f), which is the 
endogenous decision of firms. As we shall see, for FDI firms, the more productive 
                                                        
1 By this assumption, we rule out the case that firms use this loan to pay for domestic production so that we 
can obtain results in an open economy that are comparable to those in a closed economy and focus on the 
effect of the bank loan on firms’ financing strategy and FDI decisions. 
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the firm is, the larger A is kept and the more likely that the FDI will be successful. 
Our model thus is related to the observation that productive multinational firms 
issue corporate bonds to raise capital for FDI since the profits from FDI are 
sufficiently large and they have higher incentive to guarantee the success. 
 
2.2.2.4 Firms’ Optimal Decision 
Firm i maximizes the expected total profit from bond holding, domestic production 
and FDI. 
iiiFiD BApp ,,,
max      iiiFFiFiFiDDiDiDi rBfAFlwqplwqpE   ][  
s.t.    eiiiFiFFiDD fNBAClwlw  ; (2.1); (2.2); (2.9); (2.10); 
Note that the profit from FDI is multiplied by the probability of its success. Also 
note that in the budget constraint, CF is covered by A and f. Denoting the expected 
value of CF as C, we have: 
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  iiFFiDDeii AClwlwfNB                     (2.13) 
and Ai is determined by: 
    rfAflwqp iiFFiFiF                         (2.14) 
Equations (2.11)–(2.14) characterize the optimal choices of an FDI firm. We can 
compare the prices in the home country and the host country by comparing (2.11) 
and (2.12), noticing that F(A+f)1. 
 
The price for the domestic market has the same expression as that in the closed 
economy benchmark (equation (2.3) in section 2.2.1.4), which means that firms do 
not change their pricing strategy for the home market when they start foreign 
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business. Nevertheless, the actual nominal value of the domestic price may be 
different. When the economy shifts from autarky to openness, firms of high 
productivity adjust their investment portfolios: purchase fewer bonds (or issue 
more bonds) and allocate funds to FDI. The adjustment, as will be discussed in 
aggregation in section 2.3, induces a tougher competition in the bond market and 
drives the bond return rate up. Hence, the actual price in the home market under an 
open economy setting will be higher than in a closed economy, although they share 
the same mathematical expression.  
 
As the reserve fund A is endogenously determined by firms, the probability of 
successful FDI is also endogenized. Hence we have a look at what affect the choice 
of the reserve fund. An implicit solution of A is given by equation (2.14). The 
simulation results are provided in Appendix 2.1 (where propositions 2.3 to 2.6 are 
also simulated). We have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2.3 (reserve fund for FDI): Given that a firm maintains FDI, its reserve fund 
for FDI Ai is higher with higher productivity i, lower credit access , lower production 
fixed cost f or lower bond financing cost r.  
 
The relationship between A and  suggests a firm’s substitution in multiple sources 
of finance. When bank credit is tighter, a firm increases Ai as the alternative source 
to cover CF, so that it can maintain FDI. This finding supplements the existing 
literature in which firms are left helpless but exit production when bank credit is 
tight (Buch et al., 2009; Manova, 2007). In our model, however, firms can resort to 
alternative finance and keep production unaffected.  
 
Note that borrowing from a bank has no cost but Ai has a cost of (1+r), because Ai is 
raised either from internal funds or from the bond market. If the bond return rate is 
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higher, it is more attractive to buy bonds rather than producing, hence the firm will 
cut Ai.  
 
As for the negative relationship between fixed cost f and A, it works in two ways. On 
one hand, f is a real cost of FDI. The higher the cost is, the less incentive there is for 
firms to undertake FDI, and hence the smaller the reserve fund firms keep for FDI 
projects. On the other hand, f could be used as collateral: firms can obtain greater 
bank loans against a larger f, so they could reduce the amount of the reserve fund. 
 
An important finding is that more productive firms keep more reserve funds and 
thus have a higher probability of success in producing abroad. As FDI is more 
profitable with higher productivity, those firms have incentives to guarantee the 
FDI’s success. This result differs from the previous literature, in which the 
probability of success or the probability of firms’ default is assumed to be 
exogenous and independent of firm productivity (e.g. Buch et al., 2009; Manova, 
2007). In Li and Yu (2009), more productive firms have a higher probability of 
success but such a relationship is ex ante given without a micro foundation. In our 
model, however, the probability is firm-specific and firms themselves choose how 
much to “invest” to increase the probability of success. 
 
Proposition 2.4 (intensive margin of FDI): The more productive a firm is (higher i), the 
larger is its affiliate sale. The sale is also larger if the wage cost wF is lower or the bond 
financing cost r is lower. If a firm can maintain FDI after a credit crunch
2
 (decrease in 
credit multiplier ), it raises working capital from issuing bonds and keeps its affiliate sale 
unaffected. 
 
The first three arguments on i, wF and r are intuitive and easily verified through 
                                                        
2 We will discuss the condition for firms to maintain FDI in section 2.2.2.5.  
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equation (2.12). Higher productivity or a lower cost, either the wage cost or the 
financial cost, results in more output and sales. However, the change in bank credit 
availability  triggers firms’ adjustment to their financing strategy and affects 
affiliate sales indirectly. In partial equilibrium, when bank credit suddenly becomes 
tight, firms raise more funds from the bond market to substitute for bank credit in 
order to keep their working capital. In our model, when  decreases such that 
borrowings from banks are less, and if a firm can maintain FDI, it will increase A 
(proposition 2.3) to keep the probability of the FDI’s success. Therefore, according to 
equation (2.12), as long as the bond return rate does not change in partial 
equilibrium, the affiliate sale qiF will not be affected. This result is consistent with 
the evidence that during the recent financial crisis, a non-negligible fraction of firms 
reallocate more funds to finance working capital and their sales remain unchanged 
or even expand, especially in domestic-oriented or non-tradable sectors (World 
Bank Financial Crisis Survey 2010; 2010 Survey on Current Conditions and 
Intention of Outbound Investment by Chinese Enterprises). 
 
2.2.2.5 Cutoff Productivity for FDI 
To see how productive should a firm be to be profitable to do FDI, we calculate the 
cutoff productivity for FDI by equation (2.15), the LHS of which is the profit when 
the firm engages in domestic production as well as FDI while the RHS is the profit 
when the firm merely serves the domestic market. The firm will expand production 
to the foreign country if and only if its total profit is higher than that from only 
serving the domestic market.  
    iDiDDiDiDiFiFFiFiFiDDiDiD rBlwqprBfAFlwqplwqp       
(2.15) 
BiF comes from (2.13) and BiD comes from (2.6). Then we derive the expression of 
cutoff productivity for FDI: 
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where F denotes F(A+f). 
 
Proposition 2.5 (extensive margin of FDI): The cutoff productivity for FDI *iF is lower 
when firms face better access to credit (higher credit multiplier ), lower bond financing 
cost r, lower production fixed cost f or C, and lower labor wage wF. The expected profit of 
undertaking FDI is larger with a higher .  
 
With the support of better availability of bank credit, more firms are able to go 
abroad. Meanwhile, the induced higher expected profits make FDI more attractive 
to firms. This result implies that better credit conditions as a result of the financial 
development in a country play a positive role in facilitating firm internation- 
alization. On the contrary, various costs, such as the labor wage, overhead cost and 
financial cost, impede firms from going abroad. 
 
Moreover, we have a look at the difference between the cutoff productivity for FDI 
and that for domestic production in order to investigate the question whether FDI 
firms are necessarily more productive than domestic firms. We have the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 2.6 (cutoff gap): The gap between the cutoff productivity for FDI and the 
cutoff for domestic production (*iF 
*
iD) is lower facing lower bond rate r, larger credit 
multiplier  and lower expected fixed cost C. 
 
Comparing equation (2.16) with equation (2.8), and knowing that F(A+f)1, we 
immediately conclude that *iF*iD. Due to the existence of extra fixed costs, firms 
require higher productivity to attain positive profits from FDI. The two cutoffs are 
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equal if and only if C  0. In this case, the probability of a successful FDI is 1 and 
firms will not keep any A as it is not necessary and A is costly. Proposition 2.6 states 
that a better credit condition (higher ) or lower bond financing cost (lower r) can 
reduce the productivity requirement for FDI and promote domestic firms’ growth 
into multinationals. Note that when facing a lower bond return rate r, both cutoffs 
decrease, while that for FDI declines faster, indicating the higher sensitivity of FDI 
to financing conditions compared with domestic production.  
 
2.2.3 Complementarity and Substitution of Multiple Sources of Finance 
FDI firms have access to two external sources of finance, i.e. borrowing from banks 
and issuing corporate bonds. When facing a bank credit shock, firms adjust their 
financing strategy and fund allocation among investment projects but firms with 
different productivities react differently. Take a bad credit shock as an example.   
 
When bank credit suddenly becomes tight, i.e.  suddenly decreases, then *iF 
increases (proposition 2.5) and hence some relatively less productive FDI firms are 
forced to exit. As a result of withdrawing capital from FDI, these firms issue fewer 
bonds. In this case, deteriorative bank credit results in shrinking bond issuance, 
which we call the complementary effect of bond issuing and bank borrowing. 
 
In contrast, however, those firms that are productive enough to maintain FDI under 
a worse credit condition issue more bonds as a substitution for reduced bank credit 
and keep the working capital for foreign production unchanged (proposition 2.3 
and 2.4), which we call the substitution effect of bond issuing and bank borrowing. 
For the existence of the possibility to issue bonds as an alternative form of finance, 
firms do not necessarily experience production contraction when facing credit 
tightness, which implies the significance of multiple sources of finance in smoothing 
investment.  
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Figure 2.1 depicts intuitively the change in A with decreased  (from  to ’) and the 
differentiation of firms in financing. As we mentioned above, only those firms with 
productivities that are higher than the cutoff productivity for FDI keep reserve fund 
A. The more productive the firm is, the more A it raises (proposition 2.3). Therefore, 
A is 0 for the firms with productivities lower than *iF (), and A jumps to positive at 
the cutoff value *iF () and keeps increasing with  after that.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Complementary effect and substitution effect 
 
Facing a bank credit shock ( decreases to ’ ), the cutoff of carrying out FDI 
increases from *iF() to *iF(’). The firms with productivities in between exit from 
FDI and hence do not reserve A anymore, while those firms with productivity 
higher than *iF(’) maintain FDI and raise more A from issuing bonds. As the 
adjustment of A responding to the alteration of the bank credit condition is through 
bond finance, Figure 2.1 shows the complementary and substitution effect of bond 
finance and bank finance.  
 
 
 
 
A 
*iF () *iF (’) 
’< 
Complementary: failing 
firms do not hold A Substitution: surviving 
firms hold more A  
0 
- 28 - 
 
2.3  AGGREGATION  
 
2.3.1 CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIUM IN AN OPEN ECONOMY 
In an open economy, stationary general equilibrium is characterized as follows: (1) 
there is an aggregate cutoff productivity for domestic production *D , which is 
determined by equalizing the profit from purely holding bonds and that from 
producing domestically; (2) there is an aggregate cutoff productivity for FDI *F , 
which is determined by equalizing the total profit from engaging in domestic 
production as well as FDI with that from merely domestic production; (3) a mass 
M of incumbent firms is partitioned into three groups in terms of productivity. 
Firms with productivity higher than *F  produce domestically as well as abroad. 
Firms with productivity lower than *D  do not produce but invest in purchasing 
bonds. Firms with productivity in between produce and serve the domestic market; 
(4) a firm’s entry decision is made by equalizing the present value of the expected 
average profit flows   of all types of firms and the sunk cost for entry ef ; (5) in 
each period, a mass eM  of new entrants replaces the mass of M  of incumbent 
firms that exit, where   is the probability of being hit by the “forced-exit” shock; 
(6) product markets clear such that the consumers’ demand is met by the firms’ 
supply; (7) the labor market clears to determine the wage w (we assume the inelastic 
supply of labor L); (8) the bond market clears in a sense that there is no aggregate 
net demand for bonds, where the bond rate r is determined; (9) the resource 
constraint is satisfied such that the total income equals the total expenditure. The 
derivation of the general equilibrium is given in Appendix 2.2. 
 
2.3.2 THE COMPLEMENTARY AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS REVISITED 
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As we discussed above, when an adverse shock on bank credit occurs, the comple- 
mentary effect implies that firms divest from FDI and purchase more bonds, 
whereas the substitution effect means that firms issue more bonds to finance FDI. In 
general equilibrium, the complementary effect and substitution effect influence the 
equilibrium in the bond market and thus the bond rate oppositely. The overall 
outcome is a result of the relative scale of the two effects, which further relies on the 
distribution of firm productivity and the severity of shocks on bank credit.  
 
In a country where the firm distribution skews towards high productivity, facing 
the same contractionary bank credit shock, more firms will sustain FDI and the 
substitution effect will be dominant. As a result, the bond rate will increase, and 
vice versa.  
 
Moreover, when facing a more severe adverse shock, more firms exit from FDI and 
transfer internal fund to purchase bonds. On the other hand, the survivors in FDI 
will issue more bonds to compensate for the reduced bank finance. Consequently, 
both the complementary effect and the substitution effect are stronger and the 
overall effect is ambiguous.  
 
2.3.3 SELECTION EFFECT IN THE BOND MARKET AND AGGREGATE 
INDUSTRY PRODUCTIVITY 
 
When an economy opens, those productive firms that go abroad will issue more 
bonds from the parent country to finance foreign production. The increased 
demand in the bond market will bid up the bond return rate and thus increase the 
financing cost for all the producing firms, either FDI or non-FDI firms. Facing a 
higher financing cost, the least productive producing firms are forced to exit from 
production and become bond holders. Thus, the aggregate productivity of 
producing firms increases. Therefore, outward FDI triggers the selection effect 
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through the bond market and brings aggregate industry productivity gains for the 
parent country. 
 
As was previously discussed in Section 2.3.2, a shock to the bank credit supply can 
also influence the bond return rate and hence further the aggregate productivity 
gains. However, whether the change in bank credit conditions will intensify or 
weaken such gains relies on the relative importance of the above complementary 
effect and substitution effect. As a response to an adverse shock to bank finance, the 
rising bond rate as a result of the substitution effect will shuffle the deck and wash 
out less productive firms. However, the existence of the complementary effect pulls 
down the bond rate and mitigates this selection.  
 
 
 
2.4  CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter introduces the internal fund, bank finance and bond finance into a 
heterogeneous firm set-up and analyzes firms’ adjustment among multiple sources 
of finance and its impact on the performance of FDI and the aggregate industry 
productivity. We show that with access to the bond market as an alternative source 
of financing, firms suffering from bank lending tightness could stabilize their 
financing and maintain FDI. However, only the more productive firms benefit from 
the substitution of bond finance for bank finance. In comparison, the less efficient 
firms could not afford the higher cost of bond finance due to the increased 
competition in the bond market when economy opens, and thus exit from 
production. Therefore, the rising bond rate induces the reallocation of financial 
resources from less efficient firms towards more efficient ones and thus increases 
the aggregate industry productivity of the producing firms. Nevertheless, the 
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decreased financing demand of divesting firms helps to pull down the bond rate 
and thus weakens the above effect. 
 
Our results suggest the importance of the diversification of financial channels and 
significance of the availability of alternative financing in smoothing foreign direct 
investment, which is particularly important for low-quality firms. Moreover, the 
selection through the bond market implies the role of the capital market in 
reshuffling firms, which also proposes a mechanism of FDI-induced welfare change 
for parent countries. 
 
To focus on the role of alternative financing in stabilizing investment, we did not 
discuss the difference between bank finance and bond finance in this chapter. 
However, modeling their differences in restructuring, monitoring and screening 
will help us to understand better the limited substitutability of the two sources of 
finance and might generate more fruitful results. Moreover, modeling the financing 
sources of bank sectors and investigating the co-movement of the bank sector and 
the bond market constitute another direction for future research. In addition, 
relaxing the perfect competition assumption for the bond market and introducing a 
firm-specific bond rate are also interesting extensions. This is what I do in the next 
chapter of the thesis. 
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APPENDIX 2.1: NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 are straightforward, so here we only provide the simulation 
results for propositions 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6.  
 
Distribution of the fixed cost for FDI: Assume CF follows Pareto distribution   
   
k
F
x
b
xCxF 





 1Pr                        (A.2.1) 
with the support of [b,], where b and k are parameters of the distribution. The 
probability density function of CF is therefore given by 
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Denote the mean of CF as c, then  
1

k
kb
CEc F . 
 
A.2.1.1 Simulation of Proposition 2.3 
The optimal reserve fund A for an FDI firm is given by equation (2.14): 
    rfAflwqp iiFFiFiF    
By inserting equations (2.9), (2.10), (2.12), (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) into equation (2.14) we 
obtain equation A.2.3 for the simulation. 
  
  
  r
fA
b
fA
k
cfw
fAb
r
QP
fAb
rw
k
ii
F
k
i
k
ii
F 






























































 

/1
1
11
1
/1
1
1
1
                                                                         
(A.2.3) 
Figures A.2.1.1–A.2.1.4 depict the change in A with , r, f and , respectively.  
Parameter values 
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Figure A.2.1.1: 05.0r , 5.0i , 10f , 2 , 1Fw , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
Figure A.2.1.2: 4.1 , 5.0i , 10f , 2 , 1Fw , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
Figure A.2.1.3: 05.0r , 4.1 , 5.0i , 2 , 1Fw , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
Figure A.2.1.4: 05.0r , 4.1 , 10f , 2 , 1Fw , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
 
 
Fig. A.2.1.1 
 
 
Fig. A.2.1.2 
 
Fig. A.2.1.3 
 
Fig. A.2.1.4 
 
A.2.1.2 Simulation of Proposition 2.4 
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We derive the solution for iFq  (A.2.4) by inserting equation (2.12) and the 
distribution of FC  into equation (2.9), where variable A is determined by equation 
(A.2.3).  
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Figures A.2.2.1–A.2.2.4 show the change in iFq  with r, wF,  and , respectively. 
 
Parameter values 
Figure A.2.2.1: 4.1 , 5.0i , 1Fw , 2 , 10f , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
Figure A.2.2.2: 05.0r , 4.1 , 5.0i , 2 , 10f , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
Figure A.2.2.3: 05.0r , 4.1 , 1Fw , 2 , 10f , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
Figure A.2.2.4: 05.0r , 5.0i , 1Fw , 2 , 10f , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
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Fig. A.2.2.1 
 
Fig. A.2.2.2 
 
Fig. A.2.2.3 
 
Fig. A.2.2.4 
 
A.2.1.3 Simulation of Proposition 2.5 
Inserting 
k
fA
b
F 


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




1  into equation (2.16), we obtain equation (A.2.5) for 
simulation relating to iF . Variable A in equation (A.2.5) is determined by equation 
(A.2.3) in which i  takes the value of 

iF . Hence the result is the solution to the 
simultaneous equations (A.2.3) and (A.2.5). 
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The total profit of FDI firms is  
    iiiFFiFiFiDDiDiDi rBfAFlwqplwqp          (A.2.6). 
Inserting the optimal solutions of firms’ profit maximization problem given by 
equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.9), (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) into (A.2.6) and 
rearranging, we obtain the final simulation equation for  . 
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(A.2.7) 
Variable A in equation (A.2.7) is determined by equation (A.2.3). 
 
Figures A.2.3.1–A.2.3.4 show the change of iF  with , r, f and Fw , respectively. 
Figure A.2.3.5 depicts the increasing relationship of   with . 
 
Parameter values 
Figure A.3.1: 05.0r , 10f , 1Fw , 2 , 5.0i , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
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Figure A.3.2: 4.1 , 10f , 1Fw , 2 , 5.0i , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
Figure A.3.3: 05.0r , 4.1 , 1Fw , 2 , 5.0i , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
Figure A.3.4: 05.0r , 10f , 4.1 , 2 , 5.0i , 10P , 10Q , 
5.0 , 3 kb , 5.4c . 
Figure A.3.5: 05.0r , 10f , 2 , 5.0i , 10P , 10Q , 5.0 , 
3 kb , 5.4c , 1 FD ww , 10ef , 500N . 
 
 
Fig. A.2.3.1 
 
Fig. A.2.3.2 
 
Fig. A.2.3.3 
 
Fig. A.2.3.4 
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A.2.1.4 Simulation of Proposition 2.6 
 
 
Fig. A.2.3.5 
 
Fig. A.2.4.1 
 
Fig. A.2.4.2 
 
Fig. A.2.4.3 
 
The simulation equation for   iDiF   is derived by equation (A.2.5) minus 
equation (2.8). Figures A.2.4.1–A.2.4.3 describe the change in the cutoff gap 
  iDiF   with r, , and c, respectively. Note that given k, the relationship of 
  iDiF   and c is indirectly represented by the change in 
  iDiF   with b. 
 
Parameter values 
Figure A.4.1: 4.1 , 10f , 2 , 5.0i , 10P , 10Q , 5.0 , 
3 kb , 5.4c , 1 FD ww . 
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Figure A.4.2: 05.0r , 10f , 2 , 5.0i , 10P , 10Q , 5.0 , 
3 kb , 5.4c , 1 FD ww . 
Figure A.4.3: 05.0r , 4.1 , 2 , 5.0i , 10P , 10Q , 5.0 , 
3k , 1 FD ww .
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APPENDIX 2.2: SKETCH OF THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM IN AN 
OPEN ECONOMY 
 
Following Melitz (2003), we assume that there is an unlimited number of 
prospective firms waiting to enter our model. Each firm was born with an initial 
fund N. To enter, they first have to pay entry cost fe with their initial fund to draw 
their own productivities from a common distribution g(). g() is Pareto 
distribution with cumulative density function G() and the support of [b,] 
(Helpman et al., 2004). Firms with high productivity produce, among which the 
higher ones also engage in FDI, while those with low productivity hold bonds only. 
All the firms face a constant probability  of forced exit in each period. The forced 
exit firms can pay fe to draw new productivity again.  
 
Denotations of endogenous variables: M number of incumbent firms; eM  
number of new entrants in each period;  average profit across all types of firms; 

D  cutoff productivity for domestic production; 

F  cutoff productivity for FDI; 
P  price index; Q  aggregate goods; w  wage; and r  bond rate. 
 
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the following equations. 
 
Zero cutoff profit for domestic production:   
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Zero cutoff profit for FDI:  
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Expected average profit:  
                




 duGduGGfNrG
F
F
D
FFFDDDFeD 

 
*
*
*
1
(A.2.10) 
 
where DDDDD rBwlqp  , 
    FFFFDDDF rBfAFwlqpwlqp    
Free entry condition:  
ef
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                               (A.2.11) 
Firm entry equals firm exit:  
 MM e                               (A.2.12) 
 
Labor market clearing condition: 
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where L is the exogenous total supply of the economy, and labor demands for 
domestic production and FDI are given by: 
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Bond market clearing condition: 
   eD fNMG    
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where DeD wlfNB   and   AclwwlfNB FDeF   
 
Price index: 
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Resource constraint:  
  wLPQMfN ee                      (A.2.16) 
 
We thus have 9 equilibrium conditions as well as 9 unknowns. 
 
In equation (A.2.8)–(A.2.16),  
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and A is an implicit function of  , which is determined by equation (2.14): 
    rfAflwqp iiFFiFiF   . 
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Chapter 3 
 
Financial Structure,  
Productivity, and  
Risk of Foreign Direct Investment 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Risk is an important element in the theory of capital structure. Firms have 
incentives to reduce the costs associated with various risks by adjusting their capital 
structure (Desai et al. 2008). Meanwhile, risk is a key driving force for the volatility 
of investments and returns, which is particularly the case for FDI comparing to 
domestic investment. When comparing the FDI performances in countries with 
different financial systems, we find that outward FDI flows from countries with the 
market-based financial system like U.S. and U.K. are more volatile than those from 
countries with bank-based financial system like Germany and Japan (see Figure 3.1). 
Hence in this chapter, we investigate the question that facing business risks in 
foreign direct investment, how multinational firms choose their sources of financing 
and whether financial structure influences the volatility of foreign direct investment. 
Answering this question will illuminate the potential link of financial system and 
volatility of FDI, and further provide policy implications about how to structure the 
financial system to stabilize FDI and assist firms’ internationalization.  
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Figure 3. 1  Financial Structure and Volatility of Outward FDI 
Note: This graph shows the annual outward FDI flow (deviations from trend) of Japan, United 
Kingdom, United States and Germany over 1990-2009. Standard deviation: Japan 18.7; United 
Kingdom 72.1; United States 68.6; and Germany 35.8. The data is in billions of US dollars at 
current prices and current exchange rates. Data source: UNCTAD. 
- 45 - 
 
In this chapter, we develop a partial equilibrium model based on information 
asymmetry. The hidden information is the productivity shock, which happens 
when firms engage in FDI. A firm enters the model with a given amount of initial 
wealth as internal fund and draws its productivity. After knowing its own 
productivity, the firm makes two decisions, one is on whether investing abroad or 
not and the other is on the mean of financing if it does invest. There are two types of 
external finance: borrowing from bank or issuing corporate bonds from a group of 
bondholders.  
 
The productivity shock of FDI is ex ante unknown to all the parties (either banks, 
bondholders or firms), and it is only freely observable by the firm ex post. However, 
banks are willing to spend some resources to monitor the risk and convey the 
information to the borrowing firms after they pay an information acquisition fee 
(Fiore and Uhlig 2005). The role of the banks as delegated monitors is also assumed 
by Diamond (1984), Holström and Tirole (1997), etc. The underlining motivation for 
banks to actively participate in monitoring investment is their private relationship 
with the lenders. Therefore, banking finance is usually the priori choice for less 
productive firms or firms with high agency cost. The bondholders, in contrast, have 
no incentive to do so since the risk is shared by each individual holder. Therefore, 
the cost of financing with bond is lower due to the monitor cost associated with 
banks. However, bond financing faces additional risk in the sense that under 
financial distress, firms are completely liquidized and left with nothing. 
 
Particularly, if a firm borrows from a bank, it can be told about the information of 
potential risk before making production decision. If the bank tells that a good shock 
will happen, the firm will engage in FDI and get positive profit; while if a bad shock 
is coming such that FDI is not profitable, the firm has the option to abstain from FDI 
trial. Thus, when firms choose bank financing, they pay an extra fee to protect 
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themselves from the risk of productivity shock. In contrast, if the firm uses bond 
financing, it saves the information acquisition fee but expose itself to the risk. When 
facing a good shock, the firm gets positive net profit from FDI abstracting a fixed 
repayment to bondholders. However, it could happen that the firm is not able to 
repay the bondholders when suffering from a bad shock. In this case, the firm 
defaults and gets nothing whereas the bondholders completely seize all the 
generated revenues of the firm.  
 
The first result that our model delivers is firms’ partition in financing in terms of 
productivity. Those firms trying to do FDI but with relatively low productivities use 
bank finance to reveal the information on productivity shock ex ante to reduce the 
potential risks, and this is similar to purchasing insurance. In comparison, those 
firms with high productivities and thus able to counterweigh bad productivity 
shocks prefer to skip the costly middleman and issue bond directly.  
 
Secondly, the variance of productivity shocks (the indicator of risks) also impacts 
firms’ financing choices. Firms investing in low-risk host countries prefer bond 
finance since in this case the insurance from banks is not worthwhile. By contrast, 
firms who engage in FDI in more risky locations are more likely to use bank finance. 
This result links the financial structure of FDI sourcing country with the 
characteristics of its host countries as well as the volatility of its FDI flows. Higher 
ratio of bond finance relative to bank finance is associated with safer and less 
volatile foreign investment.  
 
Thirdly, the relative cost of bank finance and bond finance matters for firms’ 
financing decision. Intuitively, firms are inclined to use relatively cheaper finance.  
 
This chapter contributes to the rare research on the impact of financial development 
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on FDI. What distinguishes us is the investigation on the structure effect of financial 
development. Besides reproducing the results that reduction of financing cost 
facilitates FDI as discussed in existing literatures, we set up a link between financial 
structure and FDI locations as well as volatilities based on the fact that foreign 
investment faces significant risks and firms have incentive to reduce such risks by 
choosing different financing instruments. By doing so, we suggest a new direction 
of policy on reforming the structure of financial systems to promote firms’ 
internationalization. 
 
It also contributes to a huge body of capital structure literature in the following two 
aspects: first, we use productivity as a reference to segment firms in the choice of 
financing. We argue that productivity, besides leverage, size or cash flow focused in 
previous literatures, could be a key indicator for firm’s profitability and default 
probability, and affect its financing choices. Second, we incorporate product market 
into a financial structure model. Instead of calculating return of investment as in 
prior studies, we derive firms’ pricing and the revenues generated in product 
market such that the impact of financing on the intensive margin of FDI is discussed. 
In addition, we introduce the continuous stochastic states to calculate the cutoff 
productivities and derive the aggregated results for the whole economy. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 derives the model 
and firm-level predictions. Section 3.3 derives the aggregation results and discusses 
the relationships between financial structure, productivity and FDI risks. Section 3.4 
provides some facts and evidences. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 THE MODEL 
 
Consider a world with two countries, one home country and one potential host 
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country for FDI.1 We focus on the behavior of firms from home country. 
 
A continuum of firms is born with internal fund n, and they are heterogeneous in 
terms of productivity1. Following Melitz (2003), we assume that firm i draws its 
idiosyncratic productivity 1i from a common distribution G(1). After the 
productivity is revealed, the firm decides whether to engage in FDI or not. If it does 
not invest in foreign country, the firm can invest all its funds in a safe asset to get 
gross return of Rn where R is the exogenous safe return rate in the economy. Instead, 
if the firm decides to carry out FDI, it faces a productivity shock 2, which brings 
uncertainty for the FDI revenue. The property of the shock will be specified in 
details when we introduce production. 
 
Assume that labor is the only input in production, which must be prepaid. Also 
assume that firms’ internal funds are not enough to fully finance the production, 
hence they need to borrow. There are two types of external creditors: one is banks 
and the other is a group of bondholders. Both of them have access to the safe return 
R, but they differ in the following aspects: 
 
As the delegated monitor of investors (Diamond, 1984), banks are willing to collect 
information on investment projects of their borrowers. In our model, we assume 
that banks spend resources to acquire information about the productivity shock 2. 
Then conditional on the information obtained, banks offer firms the option to get 
loans and do FDI or abstain from FDI and keep their initial wealth. However, the 
reduced uncertainty comes at a cost, namely that an information acquisition fee is 
paid by firms to banks, which is assumed to be a share of the internal fund: n. 
 
                                                             
1
 When we look at the data later in section 3.4, particularly when we examine the relationship 
between financial structure and average risk of FDI per destination country, we extend the model 
to multiple host countries setting. 
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In comparison, the bondholders also offer the firms options to obtain funds, but 
there is no ex ante information acquisition about the risk of FDI. This assumption 
can be justified by the idea that there might be free-riding problems among 
bondholders since the risk is shared. As a consequence, bond finance saves the 
intermediary cost but it is a more risky choice because in a situation of financial 
distress (a very low 2 is realized), firms will be fully liquidized by bondholders and 
completely lose their initial wealth.  
 
Intuitively, firms that have bad draws of initial productivities earn no more profit in 
FDI with either type of external finance than the safe return, and these firms 
immediately choose no FDI option. Firms with intermediate productivities go to 
banks and spend some initial wealth to “buy security” as they are more likely to 
suffer from financial distress even under the same risk. Those most productive firms 
would rather skip the costly middleman and issue finance from bondholders 
directly. The structure is summarized in Figure 3.2: 
 
 
                  ① 
                        No FDI: profit S =( R-1)n 
                                        ②-1 
                                              Give up: profit A1=(R-1)(1-)n 
             ② 
Firm i, n, i1        FDI with        ②-2 
                       Bank Finance   FDI: profit A2 
 
                         ③-1 
③                  Default: profit B2=-n 
FDI with 
                       Bond Finance    ③-2 
 Repay: profit B2 
 
Figure 3.2  Production and Financing Choices 
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3.2.1 Demand 
 
The utility function of a representative household in host country is: 
11 
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
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where the set  denotes the mass of available varieties and  denotes the elasticity 
of substitution between any two varieties. Defining the aggregate good QU with 
aggregate price 
   


 1
1
1
i
iF dipP
 
and solving the expenditure minimization problem of the consumer, we have the 
demand function for every variety i: 
Q
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iF
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
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                            (3.1) 
 
3.2.2 Production 
 
Each firm i produces a distinct variety in FDI, and labor is the only input. The cost 
function is given as: 
 f
q
l
i
iF
iF 
21
                              (3.2) 
where liF is the labor input, qiF output and f the fixed cost for production (measured 
in units of labor). The labor wage is normalized to 1. 
 
2 is the productivity shock coming from a distribution F(2). F has a non-negative 
support and without loss of generality, we assume E[2]=1. Following Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)’s proof for the interior solution, we also require that the 
hazard rate of F(2) is non decreasing in 2: 
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The mean of F(2) is 1 and the variance is (1/3)C
2. This variance, indicated by 
parameter C, is the measure of the potential risk of FDI. 
 
3.2.3 No FDI 
 
The firm is unlucky to draw a very low productivity such that FDI is not profitable. 
In this case, the firm chooses route ① and deposits all its internal fund to get a safe 
return Rn. The profit of this route is S=(R-1)n. 
 
3.2.4 FDI with Bank Finance 
 
The firm has an intermediate productivity such that it could make more profit in 
FDI than that from route ①. FDI has an additional risk 2 due to, for example, 
unanticipated institution or policy change or systematic risk in foreign economy. As 
we mentioned above, when a firm goes to a bank, the bank is willing to spend 
resources on monitoring the productivity shocks. For simplicity, we assume that 
bank monitoring is so efficient such that the uncertainty in FDI could be completely 
eliminated2. The bank then conveys the information about 2 to the borrower, 
allowing the firm to decide whether to continue with FDI or abstain from it. 
However, the firm has to pay a fee for the monitoring. Here we assume the 
information acquisition fee is a fixed share of its internal fund. Denote the share for 
                                                             
2
 Relaxing such assumption does not change our results. What we are emphasizing is the role of 
banks’ monitor compared to bond finance. 
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the fee as  so that after the payment, the firm has disposable fund (1-)n left. Banks 
have access to the safe return rate R and they are perfectly competitive. 
 
3.2.4.1 Abstain from FDI 
 
If it is told that a bad shock will happen, i.e., 2 is below some threshold value, the 
firm will abstain from FDI and invest its remaining internal funds to get the safe 
return. In this case, the firm ends up with the profit in route ②-1: 
  nRA   111                           (3.3) 
 
3.2.4.2 Engage in FDI 
 
If it is told that a good shock will happen, i.e., 2 is above a certain threshold value 
and FDI is profitable, the firm will engage in FDI and end up in route ②-2. After 
paying the information acquisition fee, the firm needs to borrow: 
 nlX iFA  1                            (3.4) 
As there is no uncertainty for bank finance anymore, the participation constraint of 
banks is given by: 
AA RXM                                  (3.5) 
where MA denotes the amount of repayment. The profit of the firm in route ②-2 is: 
222 AAiFiFiFA MXlqp   
The firm maximizes A2 subjected to the demand (3.1), technology (3.2), borrowing 
(3.4) and repayment (3.5), which gives the optimal price: 
211 

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iF
R
p

                              (3.6) 
The price is composed with markup and marginal cost where R is financing cost 
and labor wage is normalized to 1. The optimal output, labor input, borrowing and 
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repayment can be calculated with this price. 
 
3.2.4.3 Expected Profit of Route ② 
 
The expected profit of route ② depends on both payoffs in sub-route ②-1 and ②
-2 and the corresponding probability of ending up with each route. Firms with 
different initial productivities 1i have the different corresponding probabilities. 
Precisely, firm 1i choose sub-route ②-2 instead of ②-1 if and only if: 
12 AA    
which gives a threshold value of the productivity shock 2: 
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The firm will actually do FDI only if the realization of 2, told by the bank, is greater 
than 2
*,. Note that 2
* is inverse in 1i, which implies that more productive firms 
are able to bear worse shocks and thus more likely to engage in FDI.  
 
In our example distribution of 2 , we require that 2
*
[1-C, 1+C]. Accordingly, we 
derive the range of 1i  from (3.7) and define the lower and upper bound of 1i  as 
AL and AH respectively.  
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For a firm with initial productivity 1i<AL, even the best shock 2=1+C can not bring 
it profit in FDI, hence the firm will definitely end up with route ②-1. On the 
contrary, if its initial productivity 1i>AH, then even the worst shock 2=1-C can not 
stop the firm from doing FDI (end up with route ②-2). Only those firms whose 
productivities are between AL and AH might end up with either route ②-1 or ②-2. 
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Therefore the ex ante expected profit of route ② is derived in the following three 
cases: 
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Substituting A1 and A2 by previous results, and using the uniform distribution of F, 
we have: 
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(3.8) 
where  
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are positive constants that determine the “slope” of the expected profit as a function 
of initial productivity 1i. 
 
3.2.4.4 Cutoff Productivity of Route ② 
 
The firm will choose route ② rather than route ① if and only if the expected 
profit of route ② is larger than that of route ①: 
  SAE                                 (3.9) 
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When condition (3.9) is binding, a unique cutoff productivity 1A
* is determined. 
Firms with initial productivity 1i<1A
* will not do FDI with bank finance 
considering a high probability of failing besides the information acquisition fee 
charged by banks. Therefore, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3.1: the cutoff productivity for firms to do FDI with bank finance 1A
* is 
increasing with the bank cost  and firm size n.  
 
Proof: see Appendix A.3.1 
 
 is the share of firm’s initial wealth that is paid for monitoring. A higher  means a 
higher cost for bank finance, which leads to a higher threshold for firms to access 
bank loans. Moreover, the cutoff 1A
* is increasing with firm size n since larger firms 
pay higher information fee n with a given . Therefore, bank finance is less 
attractive for larger firms. This result is consistent with the one delivered by capital 
structure literature (Cantillo& Wright, 2000). 
 
Proposition 3.2: the cutoff productivity for firms to do FDI with bank finance 1A
* is 
decreasing with the uncertainty in foreign investment C.  
 
Proof: see Appendix A.3.1. 
 
When a firm goes to a bank, it pays a fee to eliminate the uncertainty in future 
investment, which is similar to purchasing insurance with a fixed payment. If the 
investment is not risky (lower C and lower variance of 2), it is not worth for the 
fixed fees. Hence going to banks is a less attractive choice; on the other hand, if the 
investment is risky, (higher C and higher variance of 2), it is more worthwhile to 
pay a fixed fee to reduce the risk in foreign production.  
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3.2.5 FDI with Bond Finance 
 
A large number of bondholders provide direct finance for firms. They have no 
incentive to monitor the risk of FDI as a result of free riding problem. Therefore, if 
firms borrow from bondholders, they save the intermediation cost but keep 
unknown ex ante about the potential shocks. When a firm draws a high 
productivity 1i such that it feels “confident” to overcome possible bad shocks, it 
would rather borrow from bondholders directly.  
 
Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral and the optimal lending contract is similar to 
debt contract where firms take all the risk. The firm and bondholders negotiate the 
amount of lending and corresponding repayment. The productivity shock is 
realized after conducting production and it is only observable by the firm. If the 
profit after repayment to bondholders is non-negative, the firm repays the 
borrowing and collects the remained profit. Otherwise, the firm defaults and its 
revenue from FDI is completely liquidized and taken by bondholders. Similar to 
banks, bondholders also have access to the safe return rate R and they are perfectly 
competitive.  
 
3.2.5.1 Optimal Contract with Bond Finance 
 
As labor must be prepaid, the firm with 1i decides how much labor liF to hire for 
FDI ex ante. According to the cost function (3.2), with input liF, the actual output of 
FDI will be: 
 flq iFiF  21
~                            (3.10) 
And the firm’s expectation of output (ex ante target output) is: 
   flqEq iFiFiF  1~                         (3.11) 
Thus, we have 
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iFiF qq 2
~                                (3.12) 
and the actual price (ex post realized price) is given by the inverse demand function 
(3.1): 
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where piF denotes the ex ante target price.  
 
To finance FDI, the firm needs to borrow 
nlX iFB                                (3.14) 
Denote the repayment as MB, which is negotiated by the firm and bondholders. 
Then the actual profit of the firm after repayment to bondholders is given by: 
BBiFiFiFB MXlqp 
~~                      (3.15) 
The firm will repay MB if and only if B 0. 
 
The optimal lending contract specifies borrowing XB and repayment MB and the 
payoffs are distributed according to the following plan: 
 
 If B 0, the firm gets B and bondholders get MB.  
 
 If B <0, the firm defaults and get 0 while bondholders get liquidized value of 
FDI total revenue. 
 
Note that B = 0 determines a threshold level of shock 2
B* shown in expression 
(3.16) such that if the firm encounters a shock 2<2
B*, it will default.  
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The threshold level of shock 2
B* depends on the repayment, firm initial wealth as 
well as target price and output, which are further positively determined by the 
firm’s initial productivity 1i. Hence 2
B* is decreasing with 1i, implying that the 
more productive firms are less likely to default.  
 
Similarly, we require 2
B*
[1-C, 1+C], which gives some partitions on 1i. Analogous 
to the case in bank finance, if 2
B*>1+C, i.e., 1i is below some certain level BL, this 
firm will default even if it has the best productivity shock when the firm borrows 
from bondholders; on the other hand, if 2
B*<1-C, i.e., 1i is above some level BH, this 
firm will never default even if it encounters the worst shock. Only those firms 
whose productivities are between BL and BH have both possibilities.  
 
If 2
B*
[1-C, 1+C], the expected profit of FDI with bond finance is: 
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The participation constraint of bondholders is given by: 
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Maximizing (3.17) subject to (3.18) gives the ex ante target price of FDI  
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and the optimal amount of lending: 
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Compared to (3.6), the optimal price includes an extra cost 1/ induced by potential 
risk. Note that  is decreasing in C, meaning that a higher potential risk results in a 
higher price.  
 
Meanwhile, the optimal repayment is given by: 
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Hence the repayment rate on bond finance is: 
BBB XMR /                                (3.22) 
 
Proposition 3.3: the repayment rate on bond finance RB is decreasing in productivity 1i, 
and increasing in FDI risk C.  
 
Proof: see Appendix A.3.1. 
 
Comparing to the constant cost of bank finance (fixed monitor cost as well as fixed 
marginal cost), the cost of bond finance is firm-specific, which is increasing with 
firm’s default probability and thus decreasing with firms’ own productivity (See 
Figure 3.3). When FDI is more risky (higher C), the firm has a higher default 
probability, therefore bondholders charge a higher bond rate. On the other hand, if 
the firm has a higher productivity, it is less likely to default facing the same risk, 
thus its repayment rate is lower.  
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3.2.5.2 Expected Profit of Bond Finance 
 
The expected profit in route ③ is given by equation (3.17) if 1i[BL, BH]. Moreover, 
if 1i<BL, regardless of how high 2 is, the firm will default. If 1i>BH, the firm will 
never default and bondholders charge the repayment rate RB=R. The result is 
summarized by equation (3.23): 
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are positive constants that determine the slope of the expected profit of bond 
finance.  
 
3.2.6 The Choice between Bank Finance and Bond Finance 
 
Based on the results derived above, we summarize the relationships between 
Cost 
1i 
Cost of Bond Finance 
Cost of Bank Finance 
Figure 3.3 Financing Cost and Firm’s Productivity 
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expected profits and firm’s initial productivity 1i in route ① (green dashed line), 
② (red curve) and ③ (black curve) in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Comparisons of Expected Profits 
 
Three things are worth mentioning in this figure. First, if productivity 1i is 
sufficiently low (lower than 1A*), the profit of FDI trial with either bank finance or 
bond finance is lower than safe return S due to the monitor cost and existence of 
risk respectively. When 1i<BL, firms using bond finance will lose all their initial 
wealth n because of the liquidation under default. These can be seen from the 
equations (3.8) and (3.23).  
 
Second, when productivity is above certain value (AL and BL for bank finance and 
bond finance respectively), the expected profits with both bank finance and bond 
finance are increasing with productivity and that with bond finance E[B] increases 
faster. This is because the cost of bank finance is constant while the cost of bond 
finance is decreasing with productivity, as figure 3.3 shows. Note that BL needs not 
to be higher than AL. For example, BL < AL when C=0, i.e., there is no risk associated 
with FDI. In this case, no firm uses bank finance. We rule out this uninteresting case 
by assuming a certain level of risk.  
1i 
E[] 
S 
E[A] 
E[B] 
AL BL 1A
*
 1B
*
 
(R-1)n 
(R-1)(1-)n 
-n 
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Third, firms make their decisions on production and financing choice by comparing 
the expected profits of each route. Finally, firms are segmented into three types by 
the two cutoff productivities 1A
* and 1B
*. Those firms whose initial productivities 
are below 1A
* will not engage in FDI but get safe return as in route ①. Those 
whose productivities are between 1A
* and 1B
* borrow from banks and do FDI trials 
since the expected profit is higher than safe return (red curve is above the green 
dashed line). And those whose productivities are higher than 1B
* borrow from 
bondholders and engage in FDI as now the black curve is above the red curve.  
 
3.3 AGGREGATION  
After specifying firm-level decisions, we now aggregate over individual firms to 
form country-wide predictions and take them to the data in next section.  
 
3.3.1 Financial Structure of FDI Sourcing Country 
 
In the economy, a continuum of firms (the total number is normalized to 1) draws 
productivity 1i from a common distribution G(1). Denote the number of firms 
who do not engage in FDI, borrow from banks and borrow from bondholders on 
the aggregate level as NS , NA and NB respectively. Then we have 
1 BAS NNN ,  *1AS GN  , 
   *1*1 ABA GGN   ,  *11 BB GN                   (3.24) 
We define the financial structure of the economy as the ratio of total bond finance 
over total bank finance: 
T
T
BANK
BOND
FinStr                               (3.25) 
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To calculate the financial structure, we integrate firms’ borrowings from banks and 
from bondholders respectively based on their productivities. First we derive the 
total amount of bank finance. Note that not all the firms whose productivities are 
between 1A
* and 1B
* borrow from banks. Some of them, upon with a bad luck of 
productivity shock, abstain from FDI and do not borrow (route ②-1). Only those 
firms with productivity shock 2>2
* will borrow XA. As XA is given by (3.4), which 
further depends on the realization of productivity shock 2, we have the ex post 
amount of borrowing (substituting the labor demand by the optimal price (3.6) and 
the corresponding demand (3.1)): 
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Hence the ex ante conditional expected amount of borrowing from banks by firm 
with productivity 1i is given by: 
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By integration on 1i, the total amount borrowed from banks (expected value) is 
given by:  
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where 2
* is given by (3.7), and 1-F(2
*) is the probability of borrowing.  
 
Similarly, the total amount borrowed from bondholders is 
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                      (3.27) 
where XB is given by (3.20).  
 
As we can see from (3.26) and (3.27), the aggregate financial structure depends on 
the two cutoff productivities 1A
* and 1B
* as well as the distribution of G(1), which 
is intuitively depicted in Figure 3.5. Given distribution of initial productivity G(1), 
the aggregate financial structure is determined by the relative position of the two 
- 64 - 
 
cutoffs, since the integration is simply the area between the distribution and the 
horizontal axis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Segmentation of Firms in Production and Financing 
 
3.3.2 Financial Structure and Risk of FDI 
 
According to the above argument, the aggregate financial structure depends on the 
cutoff productivities for bank finance and bond finance. Therefore, we derive the 
relationship between FDI risk and financial structure by examining the impact of 
risks on two cutoff productivities. Note that 1A
* is calculated by equalizing E[A] 
and S while 1B
* is derived by equalizing E[A] and E[B] (see Figure 3.4). We have 
the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 3.1: if  11  C , in the expression for the expected profit from bank finance 
(3.8), A1 is increasing in C, A2 is decreasing in C and A3 is increasing in C. In the expression 
for the expected profit from bond finance (3.23), B1 and B2 are decreasing in C. 
Proof: see Appendix A.3.1. 
 
Lemma 1 says that with a higher risk of FDI (higher C), the slope of E[A] as a 
function of initial productivity is steeper while the slope of E[B] is flatter (see 
respectively the expressions (3.8) and (3.23)). Therefore with a higher risk, Figure 3.4 
Bank Finance, FDI Bond Finance, FDI No FDI 
1A
* 1B
* 
Productivity Distribution G(1) 
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changes to Figure 3.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 The Effects of an Increase in FDI Risk 
 
When the risk is higher, bank finance becomes more attractive since bank 
monitoring largely reduces the uncertainty and the expected profit of bank finance 
is therefore higher, resulting in a lower cutoff 1A
*. On the contrary, bond finance is 
more expensive as bondholders charge higher risk premiums. In comparison to 
bank finance, an increase in risk results in a much higher cutoff 1B
*. This result is 
driven by the slopes change of expected profits of both types of financing and it is 
independent of the initial positions of the two curves. We therefore make the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3.4: other things equal, the higher risk of FDI, the lower financial structure of 
the economy. 
 
Proof: by Figure 3.6 and Lemma 1.  
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3.3.3 Financial Structure and Productivity 
 
As Helpman et al. (2004), we assume firms’ productivities in an economy follow 
Pareto distribution. Comparing the distribution of G(1) and G(1)’ in Figure 3.7, we 
see that the average productivity of G(1)’ is higher than G(1). Meanwhile, fixing 
the two cutoffs 1A
* and 1B
*, more firms use bond finance in the economy with 
G(1)’. Hence we expect a higher financial structure under G(1)’ than G(1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Productivity Distribution and Financial Structure 
 
Proposition 3.5: other things equal, the higher productivity of the home economy, the more 
bond finance relative to bank finance is used. 
 
With proposition 3.5, we extend our discussion to multiple destination countries 
case. Assuming country-specific risk C, it is easily to conclude a pecking order of 
FDI destinations, that is, firms start FDI in countries with lower risks and then go 
further to countries with higher risks. The more productive the firm is, the more 
destinations it can invest and hence the average risk per destination is increasing. 
On aggregate level, with the increase of productivity, a country invests in more 
destinations, which bring higher risks. We thus observe a positive relationship 
between the financial structure (bond finance over bank finance) and the risk of FDI. 
Importantly, the risk of FDI in current discussion is the average risk per destination 
rather than the risk of one particular destination. Hence this result does not 
Bank Finance Bond Finance No FDI 
1A
* 1B
* 
G(1) 
G(1)’ 
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contradict proposition 3.4. Interestingly, both proposition 3.4 and 3.5 are supported 
by our empirical analysis, with risk measured respectively by “per-portfolio” and 
“per-destination country”. 
 
3.4 FACTS AND EVIDENCE 
 
3.4.1 Data 
In the section, we examine the relationship of financial structure with productivity, 
outward FDI performance at aggregate country level using the panel data including 
24 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea 
Republic, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States) over 1990-2009 period. The share of outward FDI flow of 
the 24 countries in the total world amounts to 80% in 2006. All the relevant 
variables are summarized in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
Variables Label Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
FSFDI Financial 
Structure 
377 .491823 .5307063 .0034382 3.414207 
Prod Productivity 372 35.82607 15.38012 5.585721 97.71676 
Agg.Risk Aggregate 
Risk of FDI 
Portfolio 
384 .0159558  .0061285 .0053529  .0451376 
FDI  Vol. FDI 
Volatility 
377 12826.95 23432.59 17.01059 203895.4 
Nr.of Dest. Number of 
Total 
Destinations 
384 44.65885 29.54044 2 155 
Ave_Risk_per_Dest. Average 
Risk per 
Destination 
384 .0159541 .0023777 .0117178 .0237073 
Note: Financial structure is measured as the ratio of bond finance over bank finance. 
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Productivity is measured by GDP per hour. Aggregate risk is the grade for destination 
country risk weighted by its share in a sourcing country’s total outward FDI flow. FDI 
volatility is the absolute value of deviation from trend (HP-Filtered). Number of destinations 
is counted by authors. Average risk per destination is the sum-up risk of all destination 
countries divided by the number of destinations. Risk data is from Euromoney Country Risk 
Dataset. We take the reverse of the original data, therefore, in this chapter, higher value 
indicates higher risk. Original data for calculating financial structure is from Beck (2010). The 
data of FDI flows is from UNCTAD dataset. All other data are from OECD Dataset. For the 
calculation of financial structure and aggregate risk see the appendix. 
 
3.4.2 Productivity and Location Pecking Order of FDI 
 
Evidence 1: Countries tend to invest in more destinations over time and the average risk per 
destination of outward FDI increases.3 
 
Figure 3.8 The Evolution of Number of Destinations and Productivity. Data source: OECD. 
                                                             
3
 Alternatively, we take the distance between FDI sourcing country and its destination country into account 
and calculate the average risk per distance, and we find similar pattern, namely, with the increase of the 
total distance of all destinations, the average risk per distance increase as well.  
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With the productivity growing over time, countries invest in more foreign 
destinations. As depicting in Figure 3.8, productivity and number of FDI 
destinations of a country are increasing simultaneously. They are significantly 
positively correlated except for Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Norway, and 
Spain. The correlation coefficient is higher than 0.9 for Belgium, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Korea, and Sweden. The average correlation of the 24 
countries is 0.61. 
 
With investing in more destination countries, the average risk per destination is 
increasing (see Figure 3.9), which implies a pecking order of countries in choosing 
FDI destinations from low risk countries to high risk countries.  
 
 
Figure 3.9 The Rising Average Risk per Destination of FDI 
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3.4.3 Aggregate Risk and Financial Structure of FDI 
From the original country-pair FDI data, we find that the amount of investment 
varies across destinations that have different level of risks. FDI sourcing country 
adjusts its investment in each destination to reduce the aggregate risk of the 
portfolio. We therefore define the aggregate risk of FDI as the weighted risk of all 
the destinations by the share of outward FDI flow to each destination in the total 
amount outward FDI flow. When linking it to the financial structure of the sourcing 
country, we have the following observation: 
 
Evidence 2: The higher FDI aggregate risk, the less bond finance relative to bank finance is 
exploited. 
As our model predicts, facing higher risk in foreign investment, bank finance is 
more preferred. In reality, the sourcing country divests from more risky country and 
invests more in safer locations. In aggregation across all the destinations, the 
negative relationship between aggregate risk and financial structure ratio holds (see 
figure 3.10).  
 
 
Figure 3.10 Financial Structure and Aggregate Risk of FDI Portfolio 
Note: This graph shows the relationship between a country’s financial structure for FDI and 
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its aggregate risk of FDI location portfolio. The aggregate risk is the grade for destination 
country risk weighted by its share in a sourcing country’s total outward FDI flow. It is the 
pooled data for 24 FDI sourcing countries over 1990-2009. Number of observation = 377. 
corr.= -0.29, coeff. = -24.99***  
 
3.4.4 Financial Structure and Productivity 
 
The impact of productivity on financial structure works in two ways. When the 
productivity distribution skews towards higher productivity, more firms will use 
bond finance, leading to a higher ratio of bond finance over bank finance. 
Nevertheless, as evidence 1 shows, more firms will tap more risky countries and in 
that case bank finance is more preferred by some firms to reduce uncertainty. The 
data shows a positive relation between productivity and financial structure of FDI, 
meaning the first effect dominates the second one. 
 
 
Figure 3.11  Financial Structure and Productivity 
Note: This graph shows the relationship between a country’s financial structure for FDI and 
its productivity. Financial structure is measured as the ratio of bond finance over bank 
finance. The x-axis gives the GDP per hour as a country-level measurement of productivity. It 
is the pooled data for 24 countries over 1990-2009. Number of observation = 388, coeff. 
= .0032409*. 
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3.4.5 Financial Structure and Volatility of FDI 
 
Table 3.2 Financial Structure and Volatility of FDI 
Dependent Variable: FDI Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FS
FDI
 6134.194**
* 
(2203.4) 
6791.108*
* 
(3086.663) 
5237.271*
* 
(2242.533) 
6917.573*
* 
(3113.537) 
3639.772* 
(2176.519) 
6987.342*
* 
(3116.114)  
 
Prod    213.4965*
* 
(91.67678) 
134.8542 
(235.9321) 
219.2699** 
(88.16749) 
 
146.6575 
(236.4667) 
Ave_risk_per_des
t. 
    2806907**
* 
(517045.4) 
631262.9  
(757556.7) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No  Yes 
R
2
 0.1368 0.4469 0.1476 0.4471  0.2140 0.4483  
Obs. 377 377 372 372 372 372 
Note: FDI volatility is the absolute value of deviation from trend. Financial structure is the 
ratio of bond finance over bank finance.*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Year dummies and country dummies are not reported. 
 
We implement simple regressions of FDI volatility on financial structure. The 
coefficient of financial structure is positive and significant before and after 
controlling for productivity and average risk of FDI, which implies the advantage of 
bank-based financial system in reducing FDI volatility and is consistent with the 
pattern showed in figure 3.1. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Countries with different financial structures vary in the performance of FDI, 
especially in volatility and locations. We develop a theory on how heterogeneous 
firms choose financing instrument between borrowing bank loans and issuing 
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corporate bonds to finance FDI, and investigate the link of financial structure and 
country-level FDI performance. We establish an asymmetric information model 
where the hidden information is the productivity shock that happens when the 
firms engage in FDI. As the delegated monitors, banks are willing to spend 
resources to acquire information about the coming shocks while bondholders are 
not motivated to do so as a result of free riding problem. Our model predicts that 
firms with higher productivity, hence with more resistance to bad shocks, are more 
likely to use corporate bonds whereas firms with lower productivities resort to bank 
finance since banks help reduce the uncertainty ex ante. On the other hand, the risk 
expectation in potential FDI host countries is a key determinant on firm’s financing 
choice. Firms investing in more risky countries prefer bank finance to bond finance.  
 
We test the theory with the panel data including 24 large FDI sourcing countries 
over 1990-2009. We find that countries with higher aggregate productivity, less risky 
investment portfolio of locations have higher ratio of bond finance over bank 
finance, which are consistent with the model’s predictions. Meanwhile, after 
controlling for productivity and risk, more employment of bond finance relative to 
bank finance leads to higher volatility of FDI.  
 
This chapter contributes to the emerging literature on financial development and 
firms’ internationalization with emphasis on the impact of the type other than the 
availability of external financial resources on FDI. It also differs from the existing 
capital structure literatures by proposing productivity as a determinant of financing 
choices. 
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APPENDIX 3.1: PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 AND LEMMA 3.1 
 
We begin with proof of lemma 3.1. Note that  
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 1 . Hence we 
complete the proof that A1 is increasing in C, A2 is decreasing in C and A3 is 
increasing in C. 
 
Meanwhile, note that  
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 if and only if 
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





C . As   is the elasticity of 
substitutions which is greater than 2, (and the empirical analysis shows 8.3 , 
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum, 2003), and C is between 0 and 1, condition 
11 







C  is satisfied. Therefore B1 and B2 are decreasing in C. 
 
With the result of Lemma 3.1, proposition 3.2 that 1A
* is decreasing in C can be 
shown by Figure 3.6. 
 
Proposition 3.1 can be seen from the expression of the profit (3.8). When  is higher, 
ceteris paribus, the expected profit curve of bank finance in figure 3.4 (the red curve) 
is moved down while the expected profit of no FDI (the green line) is intact. Hence 
the cutoff productivity for bank finance is higher. When the initial wealth n 
increases, both the green line and the red curve move up but the green line moves 
more due to the fact that n is paid as monitoring cost. Hence the cutoff productivity 
1A
* is also higher. 
 
Proposition 3.3 discusses the cost of bond financing. Substitute MB and XB by the 
results from optimal contract and optimal target price and labor demand, and take 
the partial derivatives with respect to 1i or C to complete the proof. 
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APPENDIX 3.2: CALCULATION OF FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF FDI 
 
We have financial structure data for the whole economy of each FDI sourcing 
country which includes the finance for FDI as well as for domestic investment. 
Remember that we are trying to build a relationship between the financial structure 
and FDI risk where the financial structure is the one for FDI only. Therefore, we 
need to isolate the finance for FDI from that for domestic investment and figure out 
the financial structure of only FDI firms (aggregate FDI firms’ financial structure). 
Our data remains at macro level. 
 
Table A.3.1 Denotations of Variables for Constructions 
Variable Label Description 
T national total investment 
Gross Capital Formation as proxy, data 
available directly 
F total outward FDI flow data available directly 
I total inward FDI flow data available directly 
D domestic firms’ total investment 
FITD  , investment of domestic 
firms, both FDI firms and non FDI firms, in 
both home country and foreign country, data 
available by calculation 
RF risk of OFDI 
the inverse of the above index of Agg.Risk, 
data available by calculation 
RD risk of domestic production 
the inverse of sourcing country risk, data 
available directly 
SF financial structure for FDI variable of interest 
SD 
financial structure for domestic 
production 
intermediate variable 
S 
financial structure of the whole 
economy,  including the finance 
for both domestic production and 
FDI. 
data available directly 
 
Since we have assumed that all firms raise their finance at their home countries, the 
investment that has impact on S of home country is just D while Inward FDI I is 
financed from foreign country. Remember D includes investment in home country 
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as well as in foreign country. Hence, the financial structure S is the overall outcome 
of SD and SF where the weight on SD is (T-I)/D and the weight on SF is F/D. We then 
have: 
SS
D
F
S
D
IT
FD 

                         (A.3.1) 
The relationship between SD and SF is tricky. According to the model and theories on 
financial structure, the higher the investment risk is, the more bank finance will be 
used compared to bond finance, which suggests an inverse relationship between 
risk and financial structure where financial structure means the ratio of bond 
finance over bank finance. For simplicity, we assume the relationship follows 
equation (A.3.2): 
FFDD RSRS                              (A.3.2) 
Inserting it into equation (A.3.1) we have the financial structure for FDI  
D
F
R
R
D
IT
S
S
D
F
F


  
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APPENDIX 3.3: CALCULATION OF AGGREGATE RISK OF FDI 
 
We get the country-specific risk rating data in grade ranging from 0 to 100, which 
takes four categories of risk: economic, political, structural and credit access risk 
into account. Higher grade implies lower risk.  
 
Consider a country i investing in N foreign countries. Its risk in FDI is the aggregate 
risk of location portfolio. To assess the aggregate risk, we construct an index for FDI 
sourcing country which is the weighted average risk of its host countries, the weight 
being the share of outward FDI flow of each host country in the total outward FDI 
flow of the sourcing country.  
 
For example, consider country i as an FDI sourcing country which invests in N 
foreign countries. Denote the outward FDI flow to each foreign country as F1, F2, …, 
FN and the risk grade of each corresponding destination as R1, R2,…, RN. Then the 
aggregate FDI risk for country i is 





N
j N
j j
j
ji
F
F
RRiskAgg
1
1
.  
Assume country risk grade Rj is constant over time during the period we examine. 
Because of the change of the share 
 
N
j j
j
F
F
1
, the weighted average risk is time 
variant. Also note that although  100,0jR , it is not necessary that 
 100,0iAggRisk  because FDI flow can be negative. 
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 Chapter 4 
 
Firm Heterogeneity,  
Endogenous Entry and Exit, 
and Monetary Policy 
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4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
As Woodford (2003) writes in his book, “the development of such a theory1 is an urgent 
task, for rule-based monetary policy ... is possible only in the case that the central banks can 
develop a conscious and articulate account of what they are doing”, many central banks 
now employ micro founded, dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models as the “theory” for their policy decisions. Most of these existing models 
have similar features that firms are monopolistic competitive, hence they have 
pricing power and they generate positive profit. Monetary policy plays a role given 
that there are rigidities in the economy, and now we have fruitful development of 
the theories, each of which incorporates different rigidities respectively (for 
example, the real rigidities are introduced by Akerlof and Yellen (1985) for real cost 
of price adjustment (also Rotemberg 1982); Mankiw and Reis (2002) for cost of 
acquiring information (sticky information); Woodford (2003) for capital adjustment 
cost; Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) for Habit formation; the nominal 
rigidities are analyzed by Taylor (1979, 1980) for wage rigidities; Calvo (1983) for 
sticky price).  
 
Most of these models, however, assume a constant number of producers, and the 
fluctuations of the economy in these models simply reflect the reactions of 
producers’ intensive margin to shocks, i.e., producers react by increasing or cutting 
output. The extensive margin, that firms’ decision of entry or exiting the market, on 
the other hand, is neglected. However, empirical studies have found strong 
evidence of pro-cyclical behavior of firms’ entry and counter-cyclical behavior of 
exit. For example, Campbell (1998) shows that the entry of either new firms or new 
establishments is significantly positively correlated with GDP. Meanwhile, the 
correlation between exit and business cycle is even larger (negative correlation). To 
justify whether such empirical observations are driven by merely a few large 
                                                             
1 Here it refers to theoretical foundation for a rule-based approach to monetary policy 
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industries or not, Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) assemble a new data set at 
industry level and confirm that each industry has such significant observations. 
Using data from Bureau of Economic Analysis and Business Dynamics Statistics, I 
draw two figures to illustrate the behaviors of entry and exit along with GDP. 
Figure 4.1 presents the real GDP of U.S together with its entry (measured by new 
business establishment) and its exit (Annual Data from 1977 to 2009). We observe 
the positive (negative) co-movements of entry (exit) with real GDP and that the 
volatility of entry and exit are larger than that of GDP. To show the pro-cyclical and 
counter- cyclical properties, Figure 4.2 depicts the corresponding cross-correlations 
between GDP and entry or exit for different leads and lags.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Cyclical behavior of entry and exit. All series are  
HP-filtered log deviation from the trend. 
 
  
Figure 4.2: Correlation between Entry(t+k) and GDP(t), Exit(t+k) and GDP(t) 
 
The entry and exit have cyclical behaviors, which certainly attract our attentions. 
But to explain the importance of embedding these features into theoretical models 
for monetary policy analysis, it is better to see how large the entry and exit account 
for volatility of GDP. Broda and Weinstein (2010) provide evidence that for a given 
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amount of increase in aggregate sales, 35% of such increase is associated with newly 
introduced products. Meanwhile, as Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007b) document, 
“the contribution of new products (including those produced at existing firms) is 
substantially important enough to be a major source of aggregate output fluctuations”. 
They also find support from Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010) who show that 68% 
of firms change their product mix within each 5-year. Of these firms, 66% introduce 
new products as well as destruct old ones. The value of newly introduced products 
accounts for 33.6% of total output while the lost value of destructed products 
accounts for 30.4%. 
 
Moreover, analyzing endogenous entry and exit has theoretical advantages. Besides 
the reports above, we also observe counter-cyclical behavior of markup. Within the 
framework of fixed number of producers, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992, 1995, 
1999) explain such phenomenon with implicit collusion among oligopolistic 
behaved firms. Galí (1995) assumes that firms face demands from two sources and 
variation in composition of aggregate demand leads to variation of markup. The 
newly developed idea stems from introduction of endogenous entry, see Bilbiie et al 
(2007a), that pro-cyclical behavior of entry increases the competition of firms, which 
in turn generates counter-cyclical property of markup. 
 
The models that incorporate endogenous entry were initialed by Bilbiie, Ghironi 
and Melitz (henceforth BGM, 2007a, 2007b). They first study the business cycles 
with endogenous entry and then add price adjustment cost to study monetary 
policy. However, one assumption of their (and some related literature, e.g., Bergin 
and Corsetti, 2008; Lewis, 2009b) models is that the exit rate of firms is constant2. 
This assumption contradicts the observations mentioned above that the exit of firms 
exhibits an even more significant negative co-movement with business cycles. 
Moreover, their models do not perform better than traditional Real Business Cycle 
                                                             
2
 In Bergin and Corsetti (2008), firms are assumed to depreciate 100% each period, i.e., the value of the 
firm is the discounted profit of next period (no further profits). 
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models in respect to second moment, and some of their impulse responses to 
technology shock is not consistent with empirical evidences (see detail in section 
4.3). Adding the feature of endogenous exit not only enables us to generate more 
plausible impulse responses of variables, but also substantially improves the 
performance of the model. 
 
This chapter of the thesis therefore develops a fully micro-founded DSGE model 
with endogenous entry and exit of firms. To enable monetary policy a role, we add 
nominal price rigidities a-la-Calvo (1983). The challenge is that since exit is 
endogenous decision of firms, we cannot maintain homogenous-firms’ setup, 
otherwise whenever bad shocks happen to reach some “threshold” that one firm 
wants to exit the market, all firms quit at the same time. We therefore assume three 
types of firms: intermediary goods producers, wholesale firms and retailers. 
Intermediary goods producers are heterogeneous in productivities and they face 
entry and exit decisions. To make our model tractable in aggregation, price rigidities 
are associated with wholesale firms whose inputs are intermediary goods and 
outputs are sold to retailers under monopolistic competition. Retailers are perfect 
competitive and sell final goods to households. The numbers of wholesale firms and 
retailers are fixed and normalized to 1 (continuum of firms with measure 1).  
 
Intermediary goods producers are financed by households subject to a fixed entry 
cost. After entry, they have to pay a fixed producing cost each period thereafter to 
be able to produce in the next period until they exit. We thus have a time-to-built 
lag of firms in our model which is in line with the observation by Devereux, Head 
and Lapham (1996a) that entries take place slightly prior to an increase in GDP 
while exit takes place contemporaneously. The fixed cost of production is financed 
by borrowing from banks who are perfect competitive. Banks attract deposit from 
households and issue loans to intermediary goods producers. Idiosyncratic 
productivity implies that some firms will generate negative profit after repayment 
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of the loans; hence it is optimal for banks to bankrupt these firms due to moral 
hazard problems. We therefore also incorporate the financial accelerator effects 
(Bernanke et al, 1999) in our model in a sense that during the economic downturn, 
for example, as the default expectation is higher, the banking sector will ask a 
higher interest rate which intensifies the severity of the downturn.  
 
This chapter has the following main findings. First, we show that an expansionary 
technology shock causes number of firms to increase and inflation to decrease. The 
former result is due to an increase in number of entry and a decrease in exit. The 
latter result stems from our new version of New Keynesian Phillips curve: inflation 
is determined by marginal cost, expectation of next period’s inflation and also 
number of firms. Precisely, expansionary technology shock benefits the incumbent 
firms because they are able to generate higher profit. This leads to a lower cutoff 
productivity below which firms are bankrupted by banks, hence exit is reduced. 
Meanwhile, as the prospect of the economy is better, more firms enter the market. 
The reactions of entry and exit causes the number of producers to increase, which 
brings higher competition and lower market share of each firm. We thus have the 
observation of counter-cyclical behavior of markups without losing the pro-cyclical 
behavior of profit. Nevertheless, more firms in the market make the production 
more efficient. Therefore when number of firms increases, there are two 
oppositional effects that affect inflation. The first is cost effect that higher 
competition drives up marginal cost which has positive impact on inflation. The 
second is efficiency effect that has negative impact on inflation. When exit is 
constant, as in BGM (2007b)’s model, the cost effect dominates the efficiency effect, 
and inflation reacts positively to expansionary technology shocks. This is actually 
inconsistent with the empirical findings reported by Dedola and Neri (2006) and 
Smets and Wouters (2007). When exit is endogenized, as in our model, the efficiency 
effect dominates the cost effect because exit decision is made along with the cost 
effect; hence inflation reacts negatively to the shock. 
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Second, our model predicts that following an increase in aggregate productivity, 
hours worked is lower in the beginning (compared to steady state level). It then 
rebounds and after about 2 years surpasses the steady state level. Thus we have a 
negative correlation between productivity and hours worked. This prediction is 
supported by many empirical evidences such as Galí (1999), Galí and Rabanal (2004) 
and Francis and Ramey (2004). Traditional RBC models fail to provide such 
prediction due to their mechanism that technology shocks shift the labor demand 
while labor supply is not affected, and therefore hours always move in the same 
direction as productivity. To be in line with the data, some augmented RBC models 
try to incorporate other driving forces to be able to shift labor supply under the 
circumstances. For example, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) propose a model 
with government purchases and Bencivenga (1992) analyzes households’ preference 
shocks. Our model proposes a new mechanism that households react to a positive 
technology shock by investing in new firms and reducing labor supply to 
incumbent firms. The labor supply is gradually restored because investing in new 
firms is less attractive when number of firms increases.  
 
Third, we find that both technology shocks and monetary policy shocks (money 
supply shocks) have persistent effect on total factor productivity (TFP). The direct 
mechanism in our model is that total output is affected by number of producers, 
and so is TFP. When there is a transitory technology shock, TFP responses positively 
and converges slower than the shock, hence the shock’s effect is amplified. Similarly, 
money supply shock also has real effect on TFP through its impact on firms’ 
dynamics. This result has important implications on empirical estimation: 
endogenous dynamics of firms explain part of TFP measured changes, and ignoring 
firms’ entry and exit may results in overestimate of exogenous shocks. 
 
In the fourth place, we observe that the impulse responses of output and labor to a 
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contractionary monetary policy shock are negative but they reach the bottoms some 
quarters after the shock and then start to rebound. Under our calibration, the model 
shows that the bottoms are reached two quarters after the shock (for both output 
and hours), exactly the same as what observed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (1994), although Christina Romer and David Romer (2004) report that the 
bottom of output is reached after 1 year and a half under a new measurement of the 
monetary policy shock. The reason behind the sluggish reaction and lagged bottom 
of output in our model is that in the short run, contractionary money supply “cleans” 
the market such that the cutoff productivity of bankruptcy is higher (followed 
immediately by more exit) and the expected profit of survivals is higher (the 
survivals are more productive firms). This generates incentives for households to 
temporarily increase the investment on new firms, which further results in sluggish 
reaction of output. The incentives fade away and totally disappear when the policy 
shock gets momentum after some time, and that is when the output reaches the 
bottom. 
 
Regarding the second moment, in the fifth place, our model performs much better 
than benchmark RBC models (e.g., King and Rebelo, 1999) and BGM (2007a, 2007b) 
in respect to the absolute as well as relative (to output) volatility of consumption. As 
a well known problem for benchmark RBC models, consumption and hours are too 
smooth relative to output. Our model makes substantial improvement in 
performance of consumption and minor contribution to hours. The additional 
volatility of consumption comes from households’ choice of establishing new firms, 
which should have been essentially similar to the choice of investment. Yet in our 
model, the “depreciation rate” of the investment is endogenized as we have 
endogenous exit of firms. This provides households better motivation and 
incentives to do investment, leading to a higher tolerance of consumption volatility. 
Moreover, concerning the correlation between variables and output, our model does 
not generate “too pro-cyclical” results which are also well-known problems for 
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standard DSGE models. Precisely, for example, both benchmark RBC model and 
BGM (2007b)’s model report the correlation between investment and output is 0.99 
while the data is 0.80 (King and Rebelo, 1999). In our model with endogenous exit, 
the correlation is 0.85, which is unambiguously more close to the data. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents our model. We 
talk about three types of producers in subsection 4.2.1, introduce banking sector and 
nominal contract in subsection 4.2.2, describe households’ behavior in subsection 
4.2.3, and aggregate the economy in subsection 4.2.4. Section 4.3 analyzes the model 
where in subsection 4.3.1 we log-linearize the model to discuss the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve, in subsection 4.3.2 we calibrate the model and do impulse responses 
to technology shocks and money supply shocks, and in subsection 4.3.3 we test our 
model in terms of second moment. Section 4.4 concludes. 
 
 
4.2 THE MODEL 
 
4.2.1 Producers 
 
We assume there are three types of producers in the market: the retailers, the 
wholesale goods producers and the intermediary goods producers. The retailers are 
perfect competitive who compose wholesale goods via a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) technology and sell the final goods to households. There are no 
rigidities associated with retailers. The wholesale goods producers are identical and 
they input intermediary goods and produce also through a CES technology. They 
are monopolistic competitive and sell wholesale goods to retailers. In addition, we 
assume price adjustment rigidities a-la Calvo (1983) that in each period, wholesale 
goods producers have probability 1- of changing the price. Finally, the 
intermediary goods producers are heterogeneous in productivity. They hire labor 
from households and produce through a linear technology (no physical capital is 
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assumed). There are potentially continuums of prospective intermediary goods 
producers who want to enter the market if the present value of entry is no less than 
the fixed entry cost. The incumbents, on the other hand, exit the market if their 
profit is non-positive (given that banks bankrupt them in case of default). The 
intermediary goods producers are monopolistic competitive and they sell to 
wholesale goods producers.  
 
4.2.1.1 Retailers 
 
Retailers are final goods producers. They differentiate the wholesale goods through 
a CES technology (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977): 
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where Yt(z) denotes the input (demand) of wholesale goods z, and  is the elasticity 
of substitution. By solving expenditure minimization problem, we have the demand 
for wholesale goods: 
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Pt is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) defined as: 
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4.2.1.2 Wholesale Goods Producers 
 
Identical wholesale goods producers are under monopolistic competition, facing the 
demand by (4.2). They demand available intermediary goods as input, and the 
technology for production is also assumed as CES function. For simplicity, we 
assume the elasticity of substitution is the same as . 
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 denotes the variety of intermediary goods while t denotes the set of available 
ones at t. As production function of type (4.4) is also widely used in international 
trade literatures because it exhibits the “love of variety” (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and 
Ottaviano, 2008), we use it here to borrow its property that the more varieties of 
intermediary goods as input, the more efficient of the production.  
 
By expenditure minimizing, the real marginal cost of production is given by (4.5), 
which is exactly the Producer Price Index (PPI): 
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It is worthwhile noticing that the PPI is not necessarily the same as CPI in our 
framework, and they are different because of the rigidities in price setting of 
wholesale firms. 
 
The demand for intermediary goods is given by: 
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Furthermore, we assume that at each period the wholesale firms have probability of 
1- to be able to adjust the price, i.e., with probability , they maintain the price 
from previous period. Therefore, the expected net present value (NPV) with price 
Pt
*(z) is: 
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where Pt
*(z) is the optimal price set at period t and it is expected to be intact at time 
t+i with probability  i. The real interest rate Rt+i is the discount factor applied by 
households who own the wholesale firms and collect their profit. The firms 
maximize (4.7) subject to the demand (4.2), where the demand at time t+i is: 
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This gives us the optimal price of z as markup times the weighted future marginal 
costs: 
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If there are no price rigidities, namely, if  = 0, then (4.8) reduces to: 
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Because we have assumed the CES production technology of retailers, the markup 
of wholesale firms is constant if there are no rigidities as in (4.8’). However, with 
rigidities, as equation (4.8) indicates, the price takes future marginal costs into 
account, meaning the markup over the current period marginal cost can be written 
as: 
 
 zmcP
zmcP
tt
i
ititit
t





 0
1



                         (4.9) 
We will see that it is this markup that is counter-cyclical without losing the fact that 
profit is pro-cyclical.  
 
4.2.1.3 Intermediary Goods Producers 
 
There are continuum of intermediary goods producers, each of which has a single 
production line and produces a differentiated goods Y(). To enter the market, it 
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must pay a fixed cost f E (measured in consumption, and financed by households) 
and then it draws its idiosyncratic productivity  from a common distribution G(). 
Following the estimation by Helpman et al (2004), G() is assume to be Pareto 
distribution with the form: 
 
k
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 1                              (4.10) 
where b is the lower bound of the distribution and k measures its shape. Since each 
firm produces differentiated goods, we can denote the goods by productivity, i.e., 
Yt() = Yt().  
 
Firms cannot produce immediately after the entry; instead, they must pay a fixed 
cost of production f F (also measured in consumption) each period thereafter until 
exit happens. Production takes place one period after fixed cost is paid. We thus 
model a time-to-built lag for production to capture the observation by Devereux, 
Head and Lapham (1996) as mentioned in introduction. The fixed cost of 
production is paid by borrowing from banks, who are perfect competitive and ask 
an interest rate Rt
m based on zero-profit participation constraint (Detail will be 
discussed in Banking Sector subsection of the chapter). Firms then hire labor from 
households and produce through a linear technology: 
    ttt LAY                              (4.11) 
At denotes the aggregate technology level, and Lt() is the labor demand by firm . 
Denote Wt as the nominal wage, the real marginal cost of production is given by: 
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As borrowing takes place one period before production, the real profit of firm  at 
period t is therefore given by: 
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Since there are no rigidities for the intermediary goods producers, they can 
costlessly adjust their prices each period. Therefore, firm  maximizes (4.13) 
subjected to the demand (4.6), which gives the optimal price (standard as markup 
times nominal marginal cost): 
 



t
t
t
A
W
P
1
                            (4.14) 
 
4.2.1.4 Entry, Exit and Number of Firms 
 
Equation (4.14) indicates that the optimal price depends on idiosyncratic 
productivity . Those less productive firms might result in non-positive profit and 
they fail to repay the loans. These firms were bankrupted by banks and exit the 
market. Therefore, there exist a cutoff productivity t
* below which firms exit. t
* is 
determined by Zero Cutoff Profit (ZCP) condition, namely: 
  0* ttD                                 (4.15) 
In our model, the cutoff t
* is endogenous variable that determines the number of 
exiting firms each period.  
 
Entry decision is made under Free Entry condition, i.e., the real value of the firm (Vt) 
after entry is no less than the entry cost f E: 
E
t fV                                   (4.16) 
As entry is financed by households, the real value of a firm is therefore discounted 
sum of expected future real profit given that the firm survives. The expression is 
provided in Households subsection of the chapter (see equation 4.25). 
 
Regarding the evolution of the number of firms, assume there are Nt-1 firms that 
borrow from banks at t-1 and produce at t. As the cutoff productivity of exit is given 
by (4.15) and the productivity distribution is given by (4.10), the number of 
survivors at t is therefore (b/t
*)kNt-1. Together with the new entry Nt
E, the number of 
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firms that borrow at t for production in period t+1 is therefore given by: 
E
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                        (4.17) 
 
4.2.2 Banking Sector 
 
The banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Banks issue liabilities 
from households with nominal interest rate Rt
n, and extend loans to intermediary 
goods producers with rate Rt
m. Banks are not allowed to participate in other 
financial activities. 
 
The inefficiency exists because of the moral hazard of firms. Explicitly, we assume 
banks have no idea of the idiosyncratic productivities of the borrowing firms. The 
lending takes place under banks’ expectation of firms’ probability of solvency next 
period. Lending contract is one-period contract and the only signal that banks 
observe is whether the firms repay the loan or not in the next period. Therefore, as 
there are Nt firms borrowing for period t+1’s production, only (b/t+1
*)kNt of them 
will be able to repay the loan with Rt
m. The rest default and banks collect their 
liquidized value. Hence the banks participation constraint is given by: 
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The first term in the left hand side of (4.18) represents the repayment from survivals, 
where Bt is the total amount of credit. The second term in the left hand side of (4.18) 
represents the expected amount that can be recovered from default firms, where 
Dt+1
F denotes the average liquidity of the default. The right hand side of (4.18) is the 
repayment to households. In addition, the financial market must clear such that the 
total credit equals to the total demand (fixed cost of production) of all Nt firms: 
F
ttt fNPB                                (4.19) 
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The financial contract is written in nominal terms such that when there are policy 
shocks, the real value of the contract will be affected, which generates an even more 
persistent effect of the policy through financial market. Moreover, the banking 
sector provides a financial accelerator mechanism in a way that when the economy 
is in the downturn where the expected likelihood of default is larger, banks ask 
higher Rt
m that intensify the recession, and vice versa.  
 
The contract is essentially similar to the Costly State Verification (CSV) debt contract 
(Townsend,1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985), where we have the modification that the 
amount of lending is assumed to be the amount of deposit (see also Fiore and Uhlig, 
2005 for a similar modification) . Such modification simplifies the calculation, as 
banks in our model only decide the rate Rt
m instead of the package (Rt
m, Bt). Given 
up such assumption (see Bernanke et al, BGG, 1999, Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997, for 
examples) adds computational burden yet the effects of the financial sector is 
enhanced rather than dampened because the financial accelerator not only works 
through price of the loan but also the quantity of loan.  
 
4.2.3 Households 
 
Households hold two types of assets: saving to the banking sector and shares in a 
mutual fund of intermediary goods producers. The mutual fund pays a total profit 
in each period that is equal to the aggregate profit of surviving firms. Denote Dt as 
the average profit of surviving firms, then the mutual fund pays   1*/ t
k
tt NbD   
to households at t (where   1*/ t
k
t Nb   is the number of survivals). The 
households can also sell the shares with the price that is equal to the value of the 
firm (Vt) on a stock market. They also collect the saving in banks (Bt-1) and money 
holding (Mt-1) in previous period, together with their earned wage from labor 
supply to intermediary goods producers and profit from wholesale firms (t,z), and 
decide how much to consume, how much money to be kept in the pocket, how 
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much savings in banks and how many shares of the mutual fund to purchase. Since 
the households do not know which firms will exit the market next period, they 
continue to finance all the surviving firms as well as new entries. The period budget 
constraint is given by: 
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It is worth noticing that by introducing mutual fund, the households are not facing 
heterogeneous firms. The mutual fund aggregates the heterogeneity and simplifies 
households’ budget constraint. Writing the problem in terms of share holding of 
individual firms will result in the same equilibrium (e.g, Ghironi and Melitz, 2005). 
Moreover, on the right hand side of (4.20), Rt
n is the nominal interest rate paid by 
banks. And according to (4.17), Nt is equal to surviving firms plus the new entry, 
meaning households finance all the entry.  
 
Assume that households gain utility from consumption and real money holding but 
suffer from labor supply. Then they maximize expected life time utility function 
(4.21) subject to (4.20): 
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Here Et denotes the expectation operator;  is the subject discount factor;  
measures the inverse of the consumption elasticity of real money demand;  is the 
Frisch elasticity of labor supply to wage and  is chosen to normalize the steady 
state labor supply. The first order conditions are given as: 
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(4.22) is the labor supply condition; (4.23) is the optimal money demand condition; 
(4.23) is the Euler Equation for saving, where t+1 is the inflation rate defined as 
t+1=(Pt+1-Pt)/Pt; (4.25) is the optimal condition for mutual fund purchase which 
gives us the expression of the value of the firm. With the free entry condition (4.16), 
the number of entry that households are willing to finance is determined. Although 
we don’t have physical capital in our model, the number of firms plays the role as 
physical capital. Households’ purchasing of new entry acts like the investment 
while the dynamics of the number of firms is essentially the same as the dynamics 
of the physical capital. 
 
4.2.4 Aggregation 
 
The economy resource constraint is given by (4.26), where the total final output is 
used for consumption, covering fixed cost of production and fixed cost of entry. 
EE
t
F
ttt fNfNCY                         (4.26) 
As mentioned earlier that number of firms acts like physical capital, f F therefore 
represents “capital depreciation” while f E represents investment. 
 
In our model, the intermediary goods producers exit the market (if they default) 
after their production is complete. In other words, all the borrowing firms produce. 
Then the aggregate goods for wholesale firms is given by (transformation of (4.4) 
where the set of the available goods are substituted by the possible productivity 
distribution interval): 
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 A is defined as: 
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Equation (4.27) says that the aggregate goods for wholesale firm can be represented 
by the average output times the number of producers (powered by /(-1)). The 
average output is the output of the intermediary goods producer whose 
productivity is  A. Similarly, we can define the (weighted) average productivity of 
surviving firms and default firms respectively by (4.29) and (4.30): 
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where uS() is the productivity distribution of the surviving firms while uD() is that 
of the defaulting firms: 
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Similar to the transformation in (4.27) and with the definitions of (4.28), (4.29) and 
(4.30), we can write the PPI as: 
 Attzt PNP  1
1
1,                           (4.31) 
The total labor demand is given by: 
 Attt LNL 1                             (4.32) 
The average profit of surviving firms is the profit of the firm with productivity t
S: 
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Dt=Dt(t
S) and the expected liquidity of defaulting firms (collected by banks) is the 
liquidity of the firm with productivity t
D: Dt
F
=Dt(t
D).  
 
Regarding the CPI, we note that each period there is only 1- share of wholesale 
firms that adjust the price to the new optimal level while  share of them keep the 
old price. Hence CPI is given by (transformation of (4.3)): 
         1
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The aggregate final output Yt is given by3: 
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Equation (4.34) says that a rising number of producers causes aggregate final output 
to increase. This effect stems from the CES production technology of wholesale 
firms that more varieties as input, more efficient the production will be. 
 
The total factor productivity (TFP) is defined as: 
t
A
ttttt sANLYTFP // 1
1
1                          (4.36) 
 
4.2.5 Shocks and Policy 
 
Following standard real business cycle models, we assume the natural log level of 
aggregate technology is an AR(1) process: 
  AttAAt AAA  1lnln1ln                   (4.37) 
where A is the autocorrelation coefficient, lnA is the steady state level of technology 
and t
A is i.i.d shocks.  
 
Money supply, as the policy instrument in our model, is assumed as an AR(1) 
                                                             
3
 See Appendix for proof 
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process too. Instead of arguing for the optimal monetary policy so far, we take such 
process as given and analyze the effect of the money supply shock. This means we 
have no feedbacks from the economy to policies.  
  MttMMt MMM  1lnln1ln                 (4.38) 
The shock t
M is assumed to be i.i.d and independent of t
A. 
 
 
4.3 ANALYZING THE MODEL 
 
4.3.1 New Keynesian Phillips Curve and Additional Trade-off 
 
To study the propagation of shocks and understand the mechanism of monetary 
policy, we log-linearize the model around the efficient steady state4. It is worthwhile 
to mention that by log-linearzing equation (4.33) and the optimal price (4.8), the 
new Keynesian Phillips curve with endogenous entry and exit it given by5: 
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where parameter =(1-)(1-)/.  
 
Compared to the benchmark New Keynesian model, equation (4.39) also relates the 
inflation dynamics with marginal cost of production. The difference is that with 
endogenous number of producers, we have an additional persistence in inflation 
dynamics. Such difference is important when we talk about the policy implications 
because disregarding the endogenous number of firms leads to an “endogeneity 
bias” when estimating the New Keynesian Phillips curve (a similar argument can be 
found by BGM, 2007b).  
 
More precisely, the number of firms, as well as marginal cost, is affected by the 
cutoff productivity t
* determined by Zero Cutoff Profit condition (4.15). An 
                                                             
4
 See Appendix for the complete log-linearized model 
5 Variable  denotes the log-deviation of x from its steady state. 
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increase in t
* plays a role as cost-push shock which on one hand increases the 
marginal cost of production, and on the other hand decreases the number of 
producers. The two effects have impact on the inflation dynamics in the same 
direction. Therefore, policy makers face an additional trade-off in our framework. 
 
4.3.2 Calibration and Impulse Response 
 
In order to have a look at the impulse responses of endogenous variables to 
aggregate productivity shock and money supply shock, we calibrate our model and 
solve it by the method of undetermined coefficients. The period in our model is a 
quarter. 
 
In the utility function of households, discount factor  is set to 0.99 which is 
standard in Real Business Cycle models and implies an annual interest rate of 4% in 
steady state. Following Mankiw and Summers (1986) that the consumption 
elasticity of real money demand is 1, we set  =1. The Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply  is set to 2 as widely applied by literatures; and  is set to 3 to match the 
steady state level of labor supply to 0.36 (where total labor is normalized to 1).  
 
The elasticity of substitution is set to  =3.8, following Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and 
Kortum (2003) and BGM (2007b) to fit U.S plant and macro trade data. The price 
rigidities is set to  =0.75, following the estimation by Angelloni et al (2006). 
Regarding the productivity distribution of firms, we adopt Helpman, Melitz and 
Yeaple (2004)’s Pareto distribution setting; and following Ghironi and Melitz (2005)’s 
calculation based on the standard deviation of sales, we set the shape parameter k 
=3.4 and the lower bound b =1. The entry cost f E is normalized to 1 while the fixed 
cost of production is set to f F =0.015 in order to capture the average job destruction 
(death) rate of 5.6%6. 
                                                             
6
 See data from “Longitudinal Business Database” 1977~2009. Total job destruction rate is around 15% per 
year, but that is induced by firms exit as well as contraction. The job destruction (death) rate measures the 
exit behavior. 
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The parameters of shock process is given by A =0.875 and M = 0.85, following 
Prescott (1986) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), where the standard deviations 
of t
A and t
M are all set to 0.01. 
 
4.3.2.1 Impulse Responses to Aggregate Technology Shock 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the impulse responses to a one percent positive aggregate 
technology shock. The vertical axes measure the percentage deviation of arguments 
from their respective steady states while the horizontal axis is the year after the 
shock (the period in our model is still a quarter).  
 
             (4.3-1) Number of Firms            (4.3-2) Number of Entry           (4.3-3) Number of Exit 
   
                (4.3-4) Output                   (4.3-5) Consumption               (4.3-6) Inflation 
   
                 (4.3-7) Markup                    (4.3-8) Labor                     (4.3-9) TFP 
   
(4.3-10) Profit                (4.3-11) Cutoff Productivity          (4.3-12) Real Wage 
   
Figure 4.3: Impulse Responses to a one percent positive technology shock 
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As expected, the positive aggregate technology shock increases output (4.3-4) and 
consumption (4.3-5). The households smooth the consumption by increasing 
investment in new firms (4.3-2). The incumbent firms benefit the positive 
technology shock at the beginning because they are having higher profit (4.3-10). 
This results in a lower cutoff productivity above which firms are able to survive 
(4.3-11) and the exit of firms is lower. However, as there are more and more entries, 
the real wage is pushed up (4.3-12), the market share of each firm is lower, and 
borrowing interest rate asked by banking sector begins to increase. The 
consequence of all these changes is that the exit of the firms starts to increase and 
surpasses its steady state level after about 3 quarters (4.3-3). These results are 
consistent with empirical findings of pro-cyclical behavior of entry and counter- 
cyclical behavior of exit. 
 
In addition, as TFP depends positively on number of firms (see equation 4.36), its 
impulse response is hence positive and converges slower than the transitory 
technology shock (4.3-9), meaning the impact of the shock is amplified (even if the 
shock is non- persistent, firm dynamics can still generate persistent responses of 
labor productivity, see Vilmi (2011) for a discussion).  
 
The inflation begins with negative reaction as the production is more efficient and 
number of firms is higher. It then rises and becomes positive after about one year 
when real wage is at peak and number of firms starts to fall (4.3-6). Our result is 
supported by the empirical analysis of Dedola and Neri (2006) and Smets and 
Wouters (2007). It is noteworthy that in BGM (2007b)’s work where only firms’ entry 
is endogenized while exit is assumed as constant, the inflation reacts positively in 
the beginning (see their figure 1). We argue that by endogenizing firms’ exit, we can 
correct such counter- intuitive behavior of inflation. The underlying mechanism is 
that with endogenous exit, the effect of endogenous entry is much stronger. 
Precisely, if exit rate is assumed as constant, then facing an expansionary technology 
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shock (even if with 0.979 persistency), the number of firms increases sluggishly 
from 0 and the prospect of entry is deteriorated very fast. On the contrary, with 
endogenous exit, the expansionary technology shock immediately decreases the 
number of exit, meaning the number of firms reacts stronger from a positive 
number. Meanwhile, the prospect of entry does not fade away that soon because 
higher competition is compensated by endogenous exit of firms, which generates 
more persistence in number of firms. Hence in our Phillips curve (equation 4.39), 
the effect of number of firms dominates the effect of marginal cost and inflation 
reacts negatively to expansionary technology shock. 
 
Regarding the well known challenge for benchmark RBC models as well as New 
Keynesian models, namely modeling the counter-cyclical behavior of markups with 
pro-cyclicality of profit, our model works fine, as Figure 4.3 (4.3-7 and 4.3-10) shows. 
The result is in line with empirical findings of Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and 
Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2007). The mechanism works through the number of 
firms, although the stories can be different: Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008)’s story is 
based on supply side such that more producing firms generate higher competitions 
and lower markups while BGM (2007a)’s story is based on demand side in a way 
that counter- cyclical markups is based on preferences of households where more 
available varieties induce pricing complementarities.  
 
Last but not least, our model predicts that the hours worked is negatively correlated 
with aggregate productivity, as (4.3-8) shows. Admittedly, there are still debates 
about relationship between productivity shocks and total hours worked, and our 
result contributes to the debate by providing a new mechanism that relates the 
aggregate productivity and total hours worked. Especially, as Gali (1999) points out, 
traditional RBC models predict a high positive correlation between hours worked 
and aggregate productivity while empirical data points out a negative correlation. 
The failure of the traditional RBC models regarding this particular prediction is due 
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to their mechanism: technology shocks shift the labor demand while labor supply is 
not affected. To match the data, RBC economists resort to other driving forces to be 
able to shift the labor supply, such as government purchases (Christiano and 
Eichenbaum, 1992) or preference shocks of households (Bencivenga, 1992). Our 
model, instead, finds the negative correlation of productivity and hours worked 
without relying on other shocks. The underline new mechanism is that households 
react to a positive technology shock by establishing new firms and reducing labor 
supply to incumbent firms. The output increases due to higher productivity and 
more producers in the market, rather than increasing labor input. Interestingly, the 
total hours worked rebound and surpass the steady state level after about 2 years in 
our simulation because labor demand is increasing and the labor supply is 
gradually restored. The dynamics of labor supply and labor demand generate the 
performance of real wage as in (4.3-12): it reaches the peak 1 year later7. Our result is 
supported by empirical observations of Gali (1999), Gali and Rabanal (2004) and 
Francis and Ramey (2004)8. 
 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Impulse Responses to Money Supply Shock 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the impulse responses to a one percent contractionary money 
supply shock. The vertical axes measure the percentage deviation of arguments 
from their respective steady states while the horizontal axis is the year after the 
shock.  
 
                                                             
7
 Initially, labor supply is decreased. Labor demand increases gradually because there are more and more 
producers. The real wage is increasing in the beginning until supply is gradually restored. 
8
 Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007a) also generate a negative correlation between labor in production and 
aggregate productivity. Their explanation is similar to ours in a sense that households increase investment in 
new firms and decrease labor supply for producing sector. However, our model differs from theirs in a way 
that they assume that labor is used in either production or setting up new firms, hence reduced labor supply 
to production is overestimated by their assumption. Our model, on the contrary, by endogenizing exit, 
allows households a better environment to build up new firms. And we don’t assume the labor is divided in 
either production or building up new firms. 
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Figure 4.4: Impulse responses to a one percent contractionary money supply shock 
 
Our model predicts that a contractionary money supply shock generates deflation 
(4.4-6), although there are still debates about the impact of contractionary monetary 
policy on price and inflation. Some VAR analysis report a rising GDP deflator over 
two year after the contractionary shock and they call this observation “Price Puzzle”, 
e.g., as mentioned by Eichenbaum (1992) and Sims (1992). However, including the 
“commodity prices” in the VAR model, as emphasized by Christiano, Eichenbaum 
and Evans (1994), the shock leads to sharp and persistent declines in price level, 
which supports our prediction here. Because the borrowing contract between firms 
and banking sector is written in nominal terms, the real value of the contract 
increases and more firms are unable to repay the loan, resulting in more exit (4.4-3) 
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and a higher cutoff productivity of survival (4.4-7).  
 
Meanwhile, output and labor decline but they reach the bottom about two quarters 
after the shock (4.4-4 and 4.4-10). This prediction is consistent with Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1994), although C. Romer and D. Romer (2004) report that 
the output reaches the bottom almost 1 year and a half after a contractionary 
monetary shock by using a new measurement of the shock. The reason behind this 
“sluggish” reaction of output and labor in our model is as follows: on one hand, 
with contractionary shock, the economy reacts immediately with higher number of 
exit. This leads to less producing firms in the market. One important impact of less 
producing firms is that the labor productivity is lower, which in turn reduces 
output and consumption. The monetary policy shocks therefore have real effect on 
the labor productivity through the channel of dynamics of firms. On the other hand, 
nevertheless, in the short run, the expected profit of surviving firms is higher 
(because the less profitable firms choose to exit the market). This generates 
incentives for households to invest in new firms, i.e., the entry is temporarily higher 
(4.4-2). Thus the behavior of households slows down the decrease of output. The 
second effect is fading out and totally disappears after 2 quarters when the 
recession induced by contractionary policy shock gains momentum.  
 
 
4.3.3 Second Moment 
 
To further evaluate the necessity of embedding firms’ endogenous exit in the model, 
we compute the implied unconditional second moments of our model for some key 
macroeconomic variables and compare them with stylized facts (data reported by 
King and Rebelo, 1999), baseline RBC model without entry and exit (King and 
Rebelo, 1999), and RBC model with endogenous entry but exogenous exit (BGM 
2007a).  
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In order to be comparable, we use the same aggregate productivity process as King 
and Rebelo (1999) where A = 0.979 and t
A = 0.00729. These two parameters measure 
the stochastic property of technology: it is substantial serial correlated. Although 
our model assumes no physical capital, the investment in new firms plays the 
substitutable role as investment in physical capital. Hence, similar to BGM (2007b), 
we use the real value of total entry to represent the investment each period. 
Moreover, as money supply in our model follows a random walk process, we 
maintain this assumption and estimate the serial correlation of money supply and 
the variance of the shocks. Table 4.1 reports the estimated autocorrelation coefficient 
and the variance of the residual of money supply M1. The original data comes from 
OECD data sets and we transform it to the log-deviation from the trend by 
HP-Filter to estimate equation (4.38).  
 
 
Table 4.1: Estimation for money supply (Quarterly Data, HP-Filtered Log-Deviation from 
Trend) 
Country U.S Euro Zone Japan Switzerland China 
Autocorrelation 0.932 0.836 0.844 0.869 0.646 
Variance 0.0084 0.0076 0.015 0.027 0.012 
 
 
As we are comparing our model with U.S data, we also use U.S’ money supply 
process, i.e., M = 0.932 and t
M = 0.0084. Table 4.2 presents the results. For each 
moment, the first number (bold fonts) is the stylized facts implied by U.S data 
reported by King and Rebelo (1999), the second number is the moment generated by 
King and Rebelo (1999)’s benchmark RBC model, the third number is the moment 
generated by BGM (2007b)’s model with endogenous entry, and the last number (in 
bracket) is the moment generated by our model with endogenous entry and exit. 
The moment is calculated by HP-filtered series as standard practice. 
 
                                                             
9
 In King and Rebelo’s benchmark RBC model, technology grows at positive rate (=1.004), while in our 
current model we don’t have such feature.  
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Table 4.2: Moments for: Data, Benchmark RBC, BGM (2007b) and (Our Model) 
Variable Xt   Xt   Xt / Yt 
Yt  1.81   1.39   1.36   (1.43)  1.00    
Ct  1.35   0.61   0.66   (1.24)  0.75   0.44   0.48   (0.86) 
Investment VtNt
E  5.30   4.09   5.20   (4.75)  2.93   2.94   3.82   (3.32) 
Lt  1.79   0.67   0.63   (0.72)  0.99   0.48   0.46   (0.50) 
 
Variable Xt  E[Xt Xt-1]  corr(Xt, Yt) 
Yt  0.84   0.72   0.70   (0.86)  1.00    
Ct  0.80   0.79   0.74   (0.88)  0.88   0.94   0.98   (0.98) 
Investment VtNt
E  0.87   0.71   0.69   (0.67)  0.80   0.99   0.99   (0.85) 
Lt  0.88   0.71   0.69   (0.71)  0.88   0.97   0.98   (0.50) 
 
Concerning the absolute as well as relative standard deviation, one of the most 
obvious improvements in our model is that consumption has higher volatility, 
which is more close to the data. Benchmark RBC models as well as BGM (2007b)’s 
endogenous entry model face the same well-known difficulties that consumption 
and hours are too smooth relative to output. Our model makes substantial 
improvement in consumption and minor contribution to hours. The additional 
volatility of consumption comes from households’ choice of setting up new firms. 
This should have been essentially similar to the tradeoff between consumption and 
investment as benchmark models, yet in our model, the “depreciation rate” of 
investment (capital) is endogenized as firms’ exit is endogenous. Therefore, 
households are better motivated and have higher incentives to do investment, 
resulting in a higher tolerance of consumption volatility.  
 
Concerning the persistence of each variable, our model is able to generate higher 
persistence of output and consumption, although, admittedly, we do not perform 
better regarding to investment and hours, which is a general problem of New 
Keynesian and RBC models.  
 
Our model also has a substantial improvement concerning the correlation between 
variables and output. The well-known problem for standard DSGE models is that 
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all real variables are too pro-cyclical relative to the data. For instance, as table 4.2 
shows, both benchmark RBC model and BGM (2007b)’s model report that the 
correlation between each variable and output is almost 1. By embedding 
endogenous exit of firms, we are able to relieve such “too pro-cyclical” problem. 
Figure 4.5 shows the simulated entry and exit (HP-filtered log-deviation from 
steady state). Compared to the data (figure 4.1), our model is successful to capture 
the behavior of entry and exit.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: simulated entry and exit (HP-filtered log-deviation from steady state) 
 
 
 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter of the thesis, I extend the framework of heterogeneous firms to a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setting and analyze the effects of 
technology shocks and monetary policy shocks. As entry and exit of firms have 
strong pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical behavior, this chapter shows that 
embedding the endogenous entry and exit is not only more close to the reality but 
also provides a new mechanism to explain many empirical findings that are 
challenges for traditional RBC models and New Keynesian models.  
 
Particularly, compared to traditional RBC models and BGM (2007a)’ model, our 
model predicts that facing an expansionary technology shock, the inflation and 
hours worked react negatively. Meanwhile, we find the counter-cyclical markups 
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and pro-cyclical profit. And we find that non-persistent shocks have persistent 
impact on labor productivity. In term of money supply shock, out model predicts a 
“sluggish” reaction of output. Moreover, our model performs better in the second 
moment regarding either absolute or relative variances as well as autocorrelations 
of variables. As we have shown, all these predictions and improved performance 
benefit from the underline mechanism of both endogenous entry and exit of the 
firm.  
 
Moreover, our model generates a new trade-off for monetary policy. As the number 
of producers affects inflation dynamics, labor productivity and aggregate output, 
we have a new policy transmission mechanism. Precisely, as there are nominal 
rigidities in lending contract and price setting, the fact of endogenous exit of firms 
implies a role for policy to stabilize the economy by stabilizing number of 
producers. This opens the door for future research on optimal monetary policy as 
well as possible fiscal policy.  
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APPENDIX 4.1: AGGREGATION 
 
Producer Price Index Pt,z: according to the definition (4.5),  
    
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 
1
1
1
,
t
dPP tzt  
If we denote the productivity distribution of producing firms as uA(), then Pt,z can 
be transformed to the aggregated price of all firms of different productivity (Nt-1 
number of producers): 
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Use the optimal pricing strategy (4.14): 
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Define the “representative” firm whose productivity is given by: 
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This gives the equation (4.31).  
 
By the similar methodology, we transform the aggregate intermediary goods 
defined by equation (4.4), using the optimal pricing strategy (4.14) and the 
corresponding demand (4.6): (same definition of  A): 
 Attzt YNY 

1
1,

  
 
This is exactly the same as equation (4.27). 
                                                             
10
 Note that all entering firms produce (including those who might default in the next period), so the 
productivity distribution of producing firm is the same as the ex ante distribution g(). 
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Aggregate Labor Demand is defined as the total labor input for producing 
intermediary goods, which is given by: 
     duLNL A
b
ttt 

 1  
 Attt LNL 1  
This is the same as (4.32). 
 
Then according to the production technology (4.11), 
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Use the result of aggregate demand to get: 
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The aggregate final output is defined by (4.1): 
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Note that because of the price rigidities, the aggregation is difficult if we have 
“weight” on different firms. Therefore we start from a “no weight” definition and 
try to find the relationship between this and the true final output Yt. Particularly, 
define: 
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Using the demand function (4.2): 
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Define st as: 
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Some manipulation of st gives (knowing that 1- of wholesale firms are able to 
adjust the price at t to the new optimal level given by equation (4.8)): 
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This is equation (4.35).  
 
Finally, the “representative” surviving firm t
S and “representative” defaulting firm 
t
D are given by (4.29) and (4.30) such that the average profit of surviving firms is 
given by (note that there is no number of survival multiplied because we are 
calculating the average profit instead of aggregate profit): 
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
*
t
duDD Stt

  
Then use the expression of profit (4.13) and definition (4.29), we can get 
 Sttt DD   
Similarly, the average liquidity of default firms is given by: 
 DttFt DD   
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APPENDIX 4.2: STEADY STATE EQUATIONS 
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Exogenous Variables Block: 
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Note: 
 
In the above steady state system, we eliminate the wholesale sector’s equations by 
substitutions. For example, equation (SS-12) comes from the following steps: 
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The optimal price of wholesale firm is given by (4.8), and in steady state it becomes: 
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Meanwhile, the marginal cost mc(z) equals to the producer price index: 
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And the optimal price of the firm with productivity A is: 
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Combine the above equations and eliminate P(A), mc(z), P*(z) and P, we therefore 
have 
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Similar substitutions and eliminations of wholesale sector’s variables are also 
applied to get equation (SS-10) and (SS-11). 
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APPENDIX 4.3: LOG-LINEARIZED SYSTEM 
Variable x denotes the steady state value calculated by Appendix 4.2 and ?̂?t denotes 
its log- deviation from x. Note that ?̂?𝑡
𝑋 denotes the deviation of number of exit at 
period t. Technology and money supply follow (4.37) and (4.38) respectively. 
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